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Abstract
My thesis is a small tour of the health care system (emergency room, hospital and home), with
special emphasis on providers. Chapter 1 analyzes how emergency room doctors change their be-
havior when the waiting room is crowded. The outcomes reflect the time spent with the patient, the
intensity of treatment, and discharge destination. Chapter 2 extends the previous setting to inpatient
care, to determine how doctors react to hospital occupancy level. It identifies doctors’ discharging
criteria as a causal factor for the positive relation between occupancy rates and readmissions. The
analysis in Chapters 1 and 2 contributes to the doctors’ incentives literature, explaining how these
agents behave in the context of a National Health Service, with no financial incentives. Chapter 3
examines the impact of informally providing care to a partner (at home) on the physical and mental
health of the carer.
Keywords: Doctors decision making, queues & length of stay, occupancy rates & readmission
episodes, spousal caregivers & caregiver burden.
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In this thesis, I offer three examples of how providers fare in three distinct stages of the health
system. In Chapter 1, I address the response of doctors in emergency care to an increase in patients
waiting for treatment. In Chapter 2, I study the relation between occupancy rates and readis-
sion episodes through the optic of doctors’ discharging criteria. These two chapters focus on the
Portuguese National Health Service where doctor’s have no performance financial incentives. In
Chapter 3, I examine the possible consequences of spousal informal caregiving on the health out-
comes of the providers in Europe.
In Chapter 1, “Doctors’ Response to Queues: Evidence from a Portuguese Emergency Depart-
ment”, with Bruno Martins, we analyze how doctors’ behavior changes with the queue size of an
emergency department. Resources in a fast-care setting such as emergency departments are limited,
(namely physicians’ time) and so it is important to study the extent to which those restrictions re-
flect on a lower provision of care when more patients are waiting. We evaluate doctors’ response to
an increase in the number of people waiting at three different stages. First, whether they spend less
time with patients. Second, whether they refer patients for fewer exams and lab tests during their
visit. Third, whether doctors are more likely to send patients home or to a primary care facility,
rather than treating them in the hospital. We use visit-level data spanning almost two years, from
a hospital in Lisbon, to estimate a high-dimensional fixed effects model that exploits variation in
the queue size at a very fine year-month-day-hour level. We estimate the causal effect of the queue
on doctors’ behavior using the number of arrivals in the previous sixty minutes as an instrumental
variable for the number of patients waiting. Our results show that, as the queue size increases,
doctors spend less time with patients, and prescribe fewer lab tests and exams. At the same time,
patients are more likely to be sent to a primary care facility, while less likely to be admitted to the
hospital. We also study the heterogeneity of doctors’ response to the queue according to patients’
1
urgency level, determined at the emergency department triage. We find heterogeneity in the time
spent with the patient, but not in the decision to send patients for exams/lab tests. When the queue
increases, physicians shorten the length of stay of patients with low urgency more than those with
a very high urgency visit. Rationing both treatment and diagnosis are not bad per se, and whether
it has negative health consequences is an empirical question that depends on the health production
function. Indeed, in the presence of a concave utility function, marginal returns to health care are
decreasing, and, if care is sufficiently high, then rationing will not have serious health effects. It
is encouraging that we find some evidence that physicians ration efficiently, in the sense treatment
intensity is reduced most for non-urgent patients, whose health impacts are more likely to be small.
I extend the setting in the previous chapter to inpatient care in Chapter 2: “A bed constraint? Hos-
pital occupancy rates and readmission episodes”. In this chapter, I focus on how admitted patients
are affected by resources constraints. I look at the relationship between occupancy rates and read-
missions to implicitly assess doctors’ decision-making process when hospitals are more crowded.
I explore the hypothesis that doctor’s react to time and resources constraints by early discharging
patients, due to pressure to admit incoming sicker patients. I use patient level data and a wide set
of fixed effects, at the year-month-week-hospital level and DRG-severity level (Diagnosis Related
Group), to conclude that occupancy rates and variation in occupancy rates just prior to discharge
are predictors of future readmission episodes. Then, I use exogenous length of stay intervals de-
fined in the DRG national tariffs list to interact with occupancy rates. Results show that when
occupancy rates are higher, patients discharged earlier than expected are more likely to be readmit-
ted in the future. This result establishes the relation between early discharges and readmissions. I
also find heterogeneity across age groups. The most affected by occupancy rates are the elderly,
particularly the elderly who are discharged earlier than expected. This fact constitutes a relevant
source of inequality.
2
Chapter 3, “Partners in care! Health effects of providing care to spouses or partners”, examines
the impact of providing care to a partner on the physical and mental health of the carer. Using
individual level data from five pooled waves of the SHARE survey (The Survey of Health, Ageing
and Retirement in Europe), I start by running models of univariate regression analysis on outcomes
of physical health and mental health, and observe that if selection is not accounted for, then car-
ers will always show lower physical and mental health in comparison to partners without caring
responsibilities. To address this issue, I include patient characteristics in the model, to account for
emotional burden, correlated behaviors and household health investment decisions, and there is a
dramatic change in the results. When models account for the patient characteristics, the physical
health of partners with caring responsibilities is better than the one of partners without a caring
role. However, I do no observe any meaningful differences for mental health.
Then, I perform propensity score matching to ensure that both groups have potential patients with
similar levels of health. The results lead to the same conclusion; carers show a slightly better
physical health status. This methodology does not guarantee causality, as for instance, non-carers’
physical condition may deter them from aiding their partners.
To account for that, I perform an event study that compares individuals who transition into care-
giving with the ones who remain non-caregivers across waves of the survey. I match observations
of both groups in the pre-treatment period, on individual and partner characteristics, to improve
the likelihood that the transition is random. The results of becoming a caregiver are positive for








Doctors’ Response to Queues: Evidence
from a Portuguese Emergency
Department1
1.1 Introduction
Hospital Emergency Departments (ED) are known for consistently operating at over capacity, with
long queues leading to waiting times that can last several hours. Patients’ arrivals to the ED pose an
externality onto other patients since they decrease the amount of resources available. This external-
ity can potentially lead to negative health outcomes for patients, either because their medical condi-
tion worsens while waiting, or because there are fewer resources available for treatment/diagnosis.
Policy-makers and managers have the difficult task of assigning capacity limits (in terms of phys-
ical and human capital) to hospitals, requiring them to balance the potential health consequences
of peak-load times and the opportunity cost of capital under idle times.
In this paper we investigate how physicians respond to the level of visits in the ED, in the context
1Co-authored by Bruno Martins, PhD in Economics from Boston University
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of a Portuguese public hospital. We study responses in three different aspects. First, we analyze
the time spent during visits, i.e., length of stay (defined as the time between being called to see the
doctor for the first time and being discharged from treatment). Second, we look at the intensity
of the use of lab tests, exams, and treatment procedures (which we proxy with the out-of-pocket
payment (OOP) due to the institutional context of our setting). Third, we study the doctors’ choice
of destination upon discharging patients. We cannot directly study patient outcomes, but we study
the effect of the queue on waiting times - time between finishing the triage and being called to
see a doctor - which have been shown to be correlated with negative patient outcomes (Hoot and
Aronsky 2008).
We use visit-level data for one ED in the Lisbon area, between January 2011 and October 2012, to
construct the waiting queue for an individual patient based on timestamps for several milestones
within an ED visit. We leverage on a fixed-effects model to exploit very fine variations in queue
size occurring within a specific hour, thus controlling flexibly for within-day variation, as well as
weekly and monthly seasonality and yearly trends. We control for the endogeneity of the queue by
using the number of arrivals to the ED in the past 60 minutes as an instrument. Visits to the ED
have been used in the literature as a source of exogenous variation in health expenditures (Eichner
1998, Kowalski 2016).
Literature on doctors’ behavior mostly studies the supply of medical care under different payment
mechanisms, based on the seminal work by Ellis and McGuire (1986).2 With no financial incen-
tives, physicians’ degrees of agency depend roughly on sense of duty, altruism, (Kolstad 2013,
Godager and Wiesen 2013) and peer or patient pressure (Chan 2016, Silver 2016).
Time constraints drive doctors to optimize based on a time-quality trade-off (Anand, Paç and Veer-
araghavan 2011, Dugdale, Epstein and Pantilat 1999). These choices are important, as time spent
with patients is related to positive health outcomes (Ogden et al. 2004, Chen, Farwell and Jha 2009,
2A brief overview of policy reforms that change physicians payment mechanisms can be found in Chandra, Cutler
and Song (2011) or McClellan (2011).
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Silver 2016) while time waiting for treatment is associated with undesirable events (Sivey 2018,
Baker, Stevens and Brook 1991, Bindman et al. 1991).
We contribute to the literature by empirically testing the hypothesis that doctors are aware of and
react to the number of patients waiting in the ED. Patients in an ED wait for care at the facility,
thereby creating extra pressure on doctors to react to congestion. Also, due to the fixed physician
compensation, Portuguese ED provide a perfect setting to study these decisions, net of financial
incentives. The literature so far has focused on waiting lists where this pressure does not exist, such
as elective surgery (Riganti, Siciliani and Fiorio 2017) or elective admissions (Siciliani, Stanciole
and Jacobs 2009). Our measure of waiting time differs from these in that our time horizon is much
shorter, and measured in hours instead of days.
Our work is closely related to Sivey (2018) and Gruber, Hoe and Stoye (2018). Sivey (2018) eval-
uates the consequences of waiting times in Australian emergency departments on the demand-side,
studying the likelihood of patients exiting the waiting room without treatment when waiting times
increase. Our paper is a complement, in the sense that we use a similar setting but rather answer
the supply-side question of doctors’ behavior. Gruber, Hoe and Stoye (2018) study how waiting
times in emergency departments in the UK lead to changes in the probability of admission and
mortality. They show that a decrease in waiting times leads to a decrease in mortality. Gruber, Hoe
and Stoye (2018) establish that doctor’s actions have serious consequences for patients’ health sta-
tus (a number of other studies have correlated waiting times with patient mortality, as summarized
by Hoot and Aronsky 2008). Therefore, while we do not have data to assess mortality, evaluating
doctors’ behavior has important consequences. In our analysis, we show the relationship between
queues and waiting times, to assess whether there is a channel through which physicians attempt
to decrease waiting times, and consequently the associated negative outcomes.
Our results show that doctors react to increased visits to the ED in several dimensions. First,
they spend less time with patients. A 1% increase in the number of patients waiting leads to a
0.42% decrease in length of stay. Furthermore, there is evidence of externalities across patients
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of different urgency degrees, since doctors decrease patients’ length of stay when the queue of
a different urgency level increases, suggesting that patients put pressure on resources across the
board. Second, doctors decrease costs of diagnosis and treatment (implying lower intensity), driven
by the extensive margin. Finally, doctors are less likely to admit patients to inpatient care.
We find mixed evidence of heterogeneity in the impact by arrival urgency. An increase in the
number of visits leads to a greater decrease in the length of stay in the ED for patients who had a
non-urgent visit than for those with a very urgent visit. However, this heterogeneity is not present
in terms of costs of treatment and diagnosis.
Understanding doctors’ reactions to queues in emergency departments is the first step for policy
makers to design mechanisms aimed at achieving optimal outcomes. For example, policy makers
seeking to reduce congestion face important indirect costs. Our results suggest that doctors use
more resources per patient as queues decrease, which could increase the financial costs for payers,
such as in a National Health Service. In addition, our findings also suggest a positive correlation
between the utilization of hospitals and primary care centers. A peak in admissions to hospitals
increases admissions at primary care centers, as doctors substitute their patients between the two.
Therefore, choosing capacity for each type of care facility must be a joint decision that accounts
for the positive correlation.
In Section 3.2 we describe the data and how we define our main variables of interest. In Sec-
tion 1.3 we present our empirical strategy and discuss identification. Section 3.4 presents our main
results, while Section 1.5 focuses on robustness checks to further support our findings. Finally, we
conclude in Section 3.6.
1.2 Data and Summary Statistics
We make use of visits-level data of a single hospital in the Lisbon area between January 2011
and October 2012. Appendix A.1 provides a brief description of the Portuguese health system.
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All visits occurring within that period are recorded electronically in the hospital information sys-
tem.
For each visit we observe several time stamps: the times (detailed to the second) in which a patient
checks in, starts, and finishes the triage, is called to be seen by a doctor for the first time, is dis-
charged by the doctor, and checks out from the ED. We present a schematic timeline in Figure 1.1,
along with the median time patients spend in each phase.
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Note: Figure shows a typical visit to the emergency department, divided into the several mile-
stones that are present in the data.
As seen in Figure 1.1, we define waiting time as the time spent in the hospital after the triage and
before being called to see the doctor 3. We define patient length of stay (LOS) as the time between
the patient being summoned to see a doctor for the first time until she gets discharged.4 Note that
our measure of length of stay does not include the waiting time, and focuses only on the time spent
after waiting to be called for treatment.
Upon being called from the waiting room, the patient may see a nurse (to take the temperature,
for example). After being seen by a doctor, the patient may be sent for further testing (such as
an X-Ray). Then, the patient needs to see the doctor again before being discharged. Our measure
of length of stay is a combination of all those factors. Length of stay is a term usually applied to
time spent in inpatient care. However, in our framework it represents the time patients spend under
treatment/diagnosis in an outpatient setting. This notation is the same used in Chan (2016).
3We chose not to include the time waiting before the triage because at that point in time, the urgency of the visit
would not have been defined.
4We do not observe any other time stamps within that interval.
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Our dataset has results of the triage, using the Manchester Triage System (MTS), in which each
patient is given a color code that represents the ex-ante urgency of the visit. There are five color
codes, which can be seen in Table 1.1, ranked into levels of increasing urgency.5 The MTS is an
algorithm that triage nurses follow in order to determine the urgency of the visit. The algorithm
includes major symptoms and further narrows down additional signs ranked by priority. Zachari-
asse et al. (2017) show, using information from a Lisbon-area hospital, that the MTS in Portugal is
a good, but not perfect, predictor of urgency level.
In Table 1.1, as well as in Figure A.1, we describe our main dependent variables. The table shows
that waiting times are decreasing in urgency, while out of pocket is increasing. Length of stay is
also increasing from green to orange. But it decreases in red urgency level visits as those patients
might be sent to the intensive care unit or die in the ED. The median value for the length of stay is
below the mean, revealing the data to be skewed to the right. To account for this, we analyze this
variable in logarithmic terms.
Length of stay in our data includes a waiting period that patients face in between treatment/diagnosis
stages. This period is weakly positively correlated with visits to the ED, as more people are wait-
ing for additional testing. Therefore, a higher number of arrivals to the ED might increase total
length of stay, even if doctors decrease time spent with the patient. For this reason, we expect our
estimate to be a lower bound on the true doctors’ response.
To evaluate doctors’ decisions regarding the intensity of treatment, tests, and exams when facing
longer queues, we use patient out-of-pocket payments.6 This variable is used given the absence
of data about the services the patients benefited from. The OOP is increasing with the costs of
procedures, which makes it a good proxy for doctors’ intensity of treatment and diagnosis instru-
ments.
5There is also an additional color code, white, that corresponds to patients who were referred from another doctor
and, therefore, the color does not directly represent urgency. We exclude these referrals, which represent 3.2% of our
sample.
6We observe the out-of-pocket the patient was charged regardless of whether she paid or not.
12
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Blue Green Yellow Orange Red All
Observations 3,098 151,980 103,117 16,710 1,374 276,279
Length of Stay Mean 139.06 128.90 274.56 465.82 353.49 204.87
SD 951.31 345.38 539.33 737.63 644.57 478.08
Median 32.68 50.27 139.30 270.07 126.72 84.62
Waiting time Mean 103.58 62.59 42.67 21.64 20.83 52.93
SD 140.67 135.96 88.62 24.30 26.98 116.38
Median 46.89 35.37 28.07 16.47 15.38 30.37
Out of Pocket Mean 14.23 16.50 21.88 28.97 37.72 19.34
SD 8.27 9.68 14.67 21.38 42.17 13.55
Median 9.60 15.55 20.00 23.80 21.21 20.00
Queue Mean 12.13 14.38 14.30 14.15 15.00 14.58
SD 9.96 10.84 11.14 10.67 11.17 10.98
Median 9.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 13.00 12.00
Note: Triage colors are sorted by increasing urgency level ranking from left to right. Length of
stay is the number of minutes between being first seen by the doctor and discharge; OOP is the
out-of-pocket payment of the visit to the ED, in Euros; Queue is the number of people in the
waiting room at the time patients are called to see the doctor. This table uses a total of 276,061
arrivals in the emergency department of a Lisbon hospital, from Jan 2011-Oct 2012.
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Note: The out-of-pocket is the amount, in euros, that a patient is charged upon
discharge from the hospital ED. The bunching points represent the value of the
access charge (the minimum valued paid to access the ED services). The values
are 9.6N in 2011, and 20N in 2012. Values below 9.6N correspond to a 50%
discount enjoyed by patients over 65 years old in 2011. Values are truncated at
50N for readability.
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We show in Figure 1.2 the distribution of the OOP variable. The three bunching points correspond
to the value of the access charge. In 2011, this was 9.6N, although patients over 65 years old
receive a 50% discount, which corresponds to the 4.8N bunching point seen in the figure. In 2012,
the access charge was 20N. Deviations from this amount correspond to extra lab tests, exams, or
treatments that patients underwent during their visit to the ED.
We use the time stamps of each arrival to define the queue. For each visit we create a tally of the
total number of patients waiting in the ED at the time the patient is called to see the doctor for the
first time. The assumption on doctors’ behavior is that this information is available to them, that
is, doctors are able to estimate how many people are waiting at a given point in time.
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Queue
Note: Queue is defined as the number of people waiting in the emergency
department at the time patients are called for treatment/diagnosis for the
first time.
The distribution of the overall congestion variable can be seen in Figure 1.3. Figure A.2, in the
online appendix, shows the distribution of the color-specific queue separately for each type of visit
as measured by the triage. More specifically, each panel uses a subset of the visits based on their
triage color and shows the queue distribution of the same color. For example, the panel labeled
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“Blue” takes all the visits with a Blue-level urgency and shows the distribution of the number of
people waiting that also had a Blue urgency. The figure shows that there is hardly any congestion
for cases that are very urgent (orange and red).
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Note: Arrivals correspond to the number of patients arriving at the hospital.
Waiting time is the number of minutes between finishing triage and being
called to see the doctor. Length of stay is the number of minutes between
being first seen by the doctor and discharge. Queue is defined as the num-
ber of people waiting in the emergency department at the time patients are
called for treatment/diagnosis for the first time. Y-axis shows the hourly
mean of each variable.
Figure 1.4 provides further statistics, showing the daily distributions of arrivals, waiting times,
queues, and length of stay. We observe clear distinctions between night and day, as both demand
and supply factors change significantly across both periods. Table A.1 shows the summary statis-
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tics separated by color urgency level.
Finally, we observe age and gender of the patients, which allows to control for patient characteris-
tics known to be correlated with general health status. In our sample the average age is 53.66 years
old and the percentage of female patients is 53.21%.
Unfortunately, we do not observe any supply variables. Yet, our identification relies on using year-
month-day-hour fixed effects to exploit only variation in a single hour, in which the number of
doctors is fixed, and which controls for selection of doctors into shifts at different hours.
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Length of Stay
Our analysis seeks to evaluate the impact that the ED queue has on the doctors’ choice of length
of stay. To do this, we start with the following basic specification.
Length of Stayist = βQueueit + γXist + τt + εist (1.1)
where Length of Stayist is the total time that patient in visit i, with urgency degree s, in time (hour)
t spends on treatment, and Queueit is a measure of how crowded the ED waiting room is. The
vector Xit includes a set of patient characteristics at the time of visit i, comprising age, gender,
age-gender interaction, and urgency level of the visit as measured by the triage color. We include
the interaction of fixed effects at the level of year-month-day-hour, τt. Therefore, we are exploiting
a very fine level of variation in congestion occurring at a specific hour across almost two years of
data. Finally, εit is the idiosyncratic error.
We are primarily interested in the coefficient β, which measures the impact of an increase in
the queue on the time spent under treatment. We defined visit i’s queue as the number of patients
waiting to be seen at the time the patient is called to see the doctor for the first time. Since patients’
17
waiting time often exceeds one hour, the queue for a given patient includes people who arrived at
a different hour in the past. Moreover, people who are called to see the doctor in the same hour
may have different queues due to, for example, arrivals between the minute in which they were
called.
Equation (1.1) implicitly assumes that an additional patient waiting affects all other patients in the
same way. However, it is natural to conceive that patients with mild complaints do not cause strong
externalities to patients who arrive with life-threatening conditions, since they are likely to use
different resources. Therefore, we estimate a second class of models with two main independent
variables of interest. First, the queue of patients waiting who have the same level of urgency, as
measured by the Manchester Triage System; second, the queue of patients who do not have the
same triage color.
1.3.2 Identification
Causal interpretation of the effect of arrivals on the outcome variable requires conditional orthog-
onality between the error term and queue variable. In our case identification may be jeopardized
by both demand-side (patients) and supply-side (doctors) factors.
On the demand side, the fact that patients often bypass gatekeepers to obtain specialty care in favor
of ED visits implies that these visits are not exogenous - at least for less urgent ones. In particular,
the time of day is highly correlated with the number of visits, in the sense that patients are more
likely to go to the emergency department in the morning and less likely at night. To prevent this
from confounding our estimates, we rely on the very finely defined fixed effects at the year-month-
day-hour, which control for selection throughout the day and exploit only variation within a single
hour.7 On the supply side, the cyclicality of treatment throughout the day reflects on the number
of doctors available and hours worked in the ED in a given hour. Swami et al. (2018) show that
the number of hours worked by general practitioners in primary care in Australia has effects on
7This approach does not control for selection within an hour, which we assume to be minimal.
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waiting times. While we do not have information regarding the number of doctors in the ED at
each time, work shifts do not change within an hour, and so this is also controlled for using the
hour fixed effects.
Equation (1.1) also suffers from a reverse causality issue caused by doctors’ actions. Less time
spent undergoing treatment/diagnosis leads to faster discharges from the ED, which in turn cause a
decrease in the number of patients in the waiting room. For this reason, estimating Equation (1.1)
by OLS will underestimate the impact of queue size on length of stay.
In order to overcome this issue we use an instrumental variable strategy. We instrument the queue
variable with the number of patients who visited the ED in the 60 minutes prior to a patient’s
arrival. For this instrument to be valid we need arrival of patients to the ED to affect length of stay
only by increasing the queue size. This argument requires patients’ decisions to go to the ED to be
independent from the total visit time. There is no formal mechanism for patients to have real time
information about visit times and so they are not likely to be aware of and react to them. 8
We choose an interval of 60 minutes for the instrument to guarantee a sufficiently high correlation
between the instrument and the dependent variables for the most power-demanding specification in
which we separately analyze the results by triage color, in which observations for some colors are
scarce. In Section 1.5 we conduct a series of robustness checks for instruments that use different
time intervals as well as over-identified models.
1.3.3 Heterogeneity by Episode Degree of Urgency
A doctor that decides time to spend with two patients optimally equates the marginal benefit of
the two. If these two patients have different benefit functions, then the doctor allocates resources
unevenly. This leads to a differential change in treatment intensity given an exogenous need for
re-optimizing (an increase in the number of arrivals might change doctors’ opportunity cost of
8Since 2016, patients can visit the website http://tempos.min-saude.pt to obtain real time information about waiting
times for hospitals ED, but this platform did not exist for the years corresponding to our data span.
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spending time with a given patient).
We postulate that the color code of the triage system picks up different benefit functions of treat-
ment for each patient. Therefore, we allow doctors to react differently to episodes that fall into
different levels of triage, s, by running the following specification.
Length of Stayit = βsQueueit + γXist + τt + εist (1.2)
This model estimates a more demanding specification in which we estimate a βs for each triage
color, while Equation (1.1) averages out these effects into a single coefficient.
1.3.4 Diagnosis and Treatment
In order to analyze doctors’ responses regarding diagnosis and treatment procedures, such as lab
tests, exams, and drugs administration, we explore the payment scheme of the Portuguese ED sys-
tem at two different levels. First, the extensive margin, which evaluates the likelihood of a patient
being sent to further care after seeing a doctor. Second, the intensive margin, which evaluates the
extent to which doctors change the quantity of treatment, conditional on the patient being sent for
additional testing.
In a visit to the ED, a patient that paid more than the access charge had additional testing/treatment
done. We explore this feature to estimate the extensive margin. We use a linear probability model to
estimate the probability that a given patient is sent for further care (example: paid more than 20N in
2012) after seeing the doctor, using the same right-hand-side variables as in Equation (1.1).
In order to analyze the intensive margin, we use the fact that in 2012 the OOP increased for every
extra exam, lab test, or treatment that the patient underwent on her visit. Costlier procedures are
mapped into weakly higher OOP payments.9 In 2011 this is not necessarily the case.10 There-
9For example, procedures that cost between 60N and 64.99N have an out-of-pocket of 12N while procedures
that cost between 65N and 69.99N have an out-of-pocket of 13N). The OOP fee schedule is available in Portaria n.
306-A/2011.
10The details are available in Portaria n. 34/2009.
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fore, we use only 2012 data to analyze the intensive margin. We estimate a conditional model
by selecting only patients in 2012 that had an OOP over 20N. Using these patients, we estimate
Equation (1.1) where the left-hand-side variable is the value of the OOP, which measures intensity
(the combination of quantity and cost) of the treatment above the access charge.
1.3.5 Destination Target
The last channel of doctors’ behavior we explore is the destination of the patient upon discharge.
The last decision that doctors face is where to send patients after seeing them. This channel may
also be influenced by the number of patients arriving at the ED, in the sense that doctors may
cope with a peak in arrivals by sending them through other channels of health care provision. We
evaluate this in two steps. First, we assess the probability of admitting the patient to inpatient
care versus discharging the patient. Second, for patients who were discharged, we compare the
probability of being sent home against the probability of being discharged to be followed up in the
primary care services. These three cases account for roughly 80% of the total sample.11 In each
case, the independent variable is a binary indicator for which we run a linear probability model of
the same specification as Equation (1.1).
1.3.6 Waiting times
Doctors’ choices of treatment intensity when faced with increases in the queue size have an effect
on the time new patients spend waiting. If doctors decrease length of stay of patients because
of the increasing queue size, then waiting times respond less than one-to-one to the queue size.
This is especially important because waiting times have been shown to be correlated with negative
outcomes (Sivey 2018) and acting to decrease those times mitigates the associated problems.
119% are admitted to inpatient care, 31% are sent to primary care, and 39% are discharged home. We leave out
options such as being sent to another hospital (6%), outpatient visit in the same hospital (9%), leaving without being
seen by the doctor or against doctor’s recommendation (6%).
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We analyze the impact of the queue on waiting times by running regressions of the same config-
uration as Equation (1.1), but in which the dependent variable is the time spent waiting for care.
Specifically, waiting time is measured as the time between finishing the triage and being called to
see a doctor for the first time. Moreover, the queue used in this particular regression is measured
as the number of people waiting to see a doctor at the time of check in (as opposed to previous
regressions). Therefore, we measure how the number of people waiting in the emergency room at
the time of check-in affects the amount of time the patient needs to wait to be called for care.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 First stage
We start by showing the strength of our instrument in Table 1.2. In the subsequent regression
analysis, the number of observations is less than in Table 1.1 because we remove from the sample
visits in the first 12 hours, as we cannot accurately calculate the queue for the initial observations
in our data. The number of arrivals in the previous 60 minutes is a good predictor of the queue,
defined as the number of patients waiting to be seen at the time of starting treatment. In fact, the
model predicts that an additional patient arriving at the ED in the past hour increases the number
of patients waiting by 0.136 when including the fixed effects. When focusing only on episodes
that have the same urgency level, the coefficient increases to 0.26, while a unit increase in different
urgency increases the corresponding queue by 0.22 (columns 2 and 3). Note also that the cross
impact between same and different colors are negative, albeit with a much smaller coefficient. In
order to use arrivals in the previous 60 minutes as an instrument, the sign of the coefficients does
not matter as long as there is predictive power.
In all three cases the excluded instruments are statistically significant. The F-stats for each of the
first-stage regressions are 30.89 for overall visits, 33.85 for visits of the same urgency level, and
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52.44 for visits of different urgency level.
Table 1.2: First stage regressions
Dependent variable: Overall Same urgency Diff. urgency
queue queue queue
Number of admis. in previous 60 min. 0.136***
(0.024)
Number of admis. in previous 60 min. - Same color 0.263*** -0.098**
(0.021) (0.044)
Number of admis. in previous 60 min. - Diff. color -0.107*** 0.217***
(0.038) (0.027)
Blue -0.161** 0.024 -0.140*
(0.068) (0.028) (0.083)
Green -0.056** 0.448*** -0.529***
(0.025) (0.048) (0.052)
Orange -0.024 -0.139*** 0.150***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.038)
Red 0.001 -0.107*** 0.148***
(0.026) (0.041) (0.049)
Female -0.018** -0.012* -0.007
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Age -0.000** -0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age 0.000** 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Instrument F-Stat 30.89 33.85 52.44
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents the effect of the number of persons arriving in the 60 minutes prior to the patient
being called by a doctor in the size of the waiting room queue. The three columns make a distinc-
tion between overall, same urgency and different urgency queues, respectively. Results use a total of
276,061 arrivals in the emergency department of a Lisbon hospital, from Jan 2011-Oct 2012. Stan-
dard errors are cluster-robust at the hour level and shown in parentheses. All models include fixed
effects at the Year-Month-Day-Hour level (15,801 levels). The benchmark triage color is yellow.
1.4.2 Doctors’ Response to the Queue
The results of estimating Equation (1.1) are reported in Table 1.3, which shows the impact of the
queue on the time spent under treatment.
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Table 1.3: Main estimates on the Length of Stay
Dependent variable: Log (LOS)
OLS IV OLS IV
Queue/10 -0.091** -0.286***
(0.036) (0.061)
Same urgency queue/10 -0.106** -0.386***
(0.044) (0.058)
Different urgency queue/10 -0.077** -0.183**
(0.030) (0.078)
Blue -1.266*** -1.297*** -1.271*** -1.337***
(0.036) (0.032) (0.035) (0.034)
Green -0.876*** -0.886*** -0.857*** -0.756***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.024) (0.031)
Orange 0.657*** 0.652*** 0.646*** 0.577***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.023)
Red -0.368*** -0.368*** -0.379*** -0.445***
(0.092) (0.084) (0.096) (0.089)
Female 0.070*** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.066***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Age 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results for the effects of queues on length of stay, making a
distinction between overall, same urgency, and different urgency queues. Results
use a total of 276,061 arrivals in the emergency department of a Lisbon hospital,
from Jan 2011-Oct 2012. Standard errors are cluster-robust at the hour level and
shown in parentheses. All models include fixed effects at the Year-Month-Day-
Hour level (15,801 levels). The benchmark triage color is yellow. First stage SW
F-stats in Table 1.2.
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The estimates for the overall queue suggest that an additional patient waiting to be seen in the
ED when the patient is called to see the doctor decreases length of stay by 2.9%. This is a large
effect, as for an average length of stay of 205 minutes, it takes only 5 additional patients to cause
a decrease in length of stay of almost half an hour. At the average number of patients waiting
(14.6), this corresponds to an elasticity of length of stay with respect to the queue of -0.42. Note,
however, that despite our linear approximation, the queue might have a non-linear impact on the
length of stay (e.g. the effect can be stronger if the queue is larger). When looking only at the
number of patients waiting with the same urgency level, a unit increase decreases length of stay by
3.9%. The coefficient on the tally of patients that do not have the same degree of urgency is also
negative. However, its magnitude is small compared to the same urgency level. The model rejects
the hypothesis that these two coefficients are equal. This result suggests that patients with different
magnitudes of arrival urgency do not use the same type of resources and, therefore, impose a
smaller externality onto each other.
In Table A.2 in the appendix, we show our results for different choices of fixed effects using the
instrumental variables estimation. In all different specifications, the coefficients are negative, but
much closer to zero than our benchmark. The estimates show the importance of using the finely
detailed fixed effects, as they control for important omitted supply- and demand- side factors, as
explained in Section 1.3.2.
We now test whether doctors respond by changing intensity of diagnosis and treatment, at both the
extensive and intensive margin.
Table 1.4 shows the results of the instrumental variables estimates on the OOP. The extensive
margin, in the first column, shows that an increase in the queue by 1 individual decreases the
likelihood of being sent for further care by 0.79 percentage points. In our sample, the likelihood
of being sent for further care or diagnosis is 54%, and so an increase in the queue decreases the
likelihood by 1.5%, at mean values. Again, patients who are waiting with the same urgency level
have a stronger impact on the likelihood of further testing than patients waiting with a different
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urgency level. As far as the intensive margin is concerned, where we estimate the impact of the
queue on the total OOP conditional on the OOP being above the access charge, the coefficient on
the overall queue is negative, but imprecise. When disentangling between the queue of the same
and different urgency levels, we still find that the impact is driven mainly by the queue of patients
who have the same urgency, rather than those of different urgency. Overall, we find evidence that
doctors decrease the intensity of treatment when the queue increases, and this is driven mainly by
the extensive margin.
Female patients have both lower LOS and OOP when compared to men. Young males might be
more likely to end up in the ED injured through participation in sports, while young females might
be more likely to resort to emergency care because of anorexia related issues, for example.
1.4.3 Heterogeneous Response
We now turn to the estimation of Equation (1.2), in which we explore the hypothesis that doctors
respond to congestion differently for patients with different urgency levels.
We show in Table 1.5 the estimated coefficient for each triage color, measured as deviations from
visits with an urgency level of Yellow. An intuitive illustration of the results is displayed in Fig-
ure A.3, which shows the differential impact of the queue on each triage color.
The point estimates suggest heterogeneity in doctors’ response to overall queues,12 where we see
that less urgent episodes have their length of stay decrease by more than those that are more urgent.
For example, an increase in the queue by one patient decreases the length of stay for yellow-colored
episodes by 2.6%, while blue-colored episodes have a decrease in length of stay of 4.6%. Besides
being small in magnitude, the estimated coefficient for “red” cannot be statistically distinguished
from zero, suggesting that increases in congestion do not affect visits that are very life-threatening.
Note, however, that only the “blue”, “green”13 and “red” coefficients are distinguishable from each
12This section shows the heterogeneous response to the total queue. Results for within-color effects are in Ta-
ble A.3.
13“Green” is statistically distinguishable from “blue” and “red”only at a 90% confidence level. At 95% confidence
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Table 1.4: Main estimates on treatment intensity
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
Dependent variable: 1 if OOP > access charge Log(OOP|OOP > access charge)
Queue/10 -0.079*** -0.036
(0.017) (0.024)
Same urgency queue/10 -0.100*** -0.055**
(0.016) (0.025)
Different urgency queue/10 -0.057*** -0.021
(0.020) (0.025)
Blue -0.478*** -0.486*** -0.191*** -0.198***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Green -0.239*** -0.212*** -0.161*** -0.142***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006)
Orange 0.178*** 0.163*** 0.168*** 0.154***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Red -0.046*** -0.062*** 0.466*** 0.452***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.025) (0.026)
Female -0.009 -0.009 -0.028*** -0.028***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 276,061 276,061 73,609 73,609
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results for the effects of queues on the intensity of treatment, making a dis-
tinction between overall, same urgency, and different urgency queues. The extensive margin
uses 276,061 arrivals from Jan 2011-Oct 2012. The intensive margin uses 73,609 arrivals from
Jan 2012-Oct 2012. Standard errors are cluster-robust at the hour level and shown in paren-
theses. All models include fixed effects at the Year-Month-Day-Hour level and the queue is
instrumented with the number of arrivals in the past 60 minutes. The benchmark triage color is
yellow. First stage SW F-stats: 30.89 (column 1); 33.85 and 52.44 (column 2); 32.54 (column
3); 34.35 and 44.59 (column 4).
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Table 1.5: Color Specific regressions
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
Dependent variable: Log(Length of Stay) 1 if OOP > access charge Log(OOP|OOP > )
access charge)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Queue/10 -0.084** -0.256*** -0.010 -0.069*** -0.009** -0.038
(0.031) (0.066) (0.006) (0.017) (0.004) (0.025)
Queue/10 × Blue -0.046 -0.203** -0.006 -0.034** 0.006 0.041**
(0.036) (0.081) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019)
Queue/10 × Green -0.014 -0.042 -0.006* -0.014* 0.001 0.003
(0.012) (0.031) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007)
Queue/10 × Orange 0.010 -0.004 0.003 -0.006 0.008* 0.002
(0.012) (0.026) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.011)
Queue/10 × Red -0.006 0.217 -0.025** -0.032 0.016 -0.034
(0.060) (0.137) (0.012) (0.022) (0.029) (0.066)
Blue -1.207*** -1.039*** -0.459*** -0.433*** -0.194*** -0.236***
(0.071) (0.127) (0.011) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020)
Green -0.855*** -0.822*** -0.226*** -0.218*** -0.161*** -0.166***
(0.031) (0.044) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011)
Orange 0.642*** 0.660*** 0.176*** 0.187*** 0.157*** 0.165***
(0.021) (0.043) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.015)
Red -0.360*** -0.681*** -0.010 0.001 0.444*** 0.513***
(0.127) (0.216) (0.027) (0.036) (0.047) (0.089)
Female 0.070*** 0.066*** -0.008 -0.010 -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age -0.001** -0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 276061 276061 276061 276061 73609 73609
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results for the interactions between queues and triage colors. For the LOS regres-
sions, results use a total of 276,061 arrivals in the emergency department of a Lisbon hospital, from
Jan 2011-Oct 2012. For the OOP regressions, the extensive margin uses a total of 276,061 arrivals,
from Jan 2011-Oct 2012. The intensive margin uses a total of 73,609 arrivals, from Jan 2012-Oct 2012.
Standard errors are cluster-robust at the hour level and shown in parentheses. All models include fixed
effects at the Year-Month-Day-Hour level. The benchmark triage color is yellow. First stage SW F-




Regarding the impact on the out-of-pocket, Table 1.5 shows that the overall negative impact of the
queues on the likelihood of being sent for further care is stronger for the low urgency visits, “blue”
and “green”. The remaining higher urgency visits have a smaller negative impact (in absolute
value) that cannot be statistically distinguished from each other. As far as the intensive margin
is concerned, none of the color-specific effects are statistically different from zero, suggesting no
effect on this margin.
These combined results suggest that doctors ration their time efficiently, in the sense that an exoge-
nous shock to ED visits will lead them to decrease more the time with patients whose condition is
not life threatening and, therefore, less likely to suffer from negative health outcomes.
1.4.4 Discharge Destination
In Table 1.6 we run linear probability models on selected discharge destinations. In a first stage we
evaluate being admitted to inpatient care against being discharged. In a second stage we compare
being sent home against being discharged to primary care services. 14
Results show that an additional arrival to the ED decreases the probability of a patient being ad-
mitted to inpatient care by 0.07 percentage points when compared to being discharged. This cor-
responds to a 0.61% decrease in the probability of being admitted, at the average probability of
admission of 11.4%. Conditional on being discharged, there is no statistical difference between
being sent to primary care or home. An increase in the queue increases the likelihood of being sent
to primary care or home in similar magnitudes. These findings suggest that doctors react to peaks
in arrivals to the ED by sending patients away from hospitals, sending them both to primary care
facilities or their homes.
level, as in Figure A.3, only “blue” and “red” are statistically distinguishable.
14We choose to model the probabilities of the main discharge destinations sequentially because multinomial models
do not easily accommodate the high-level fixed effects that our data exploit for identification. We have tried both a
multinomial logit and poisson estimation with high dimensional fixed effects, but did not obtain convergence.
29
Table 1.6: Discharge destination
Dependent variable: 1 if admitted to 1 if primary care |
inpatient care discharged
OLS IV OLS IV
Queue/10 -0.007*** -0.042*** -0.026 0.019
(0.002) (0.015) (0.019) (0.027)
Blue -0.143*** -0.147*** -0.057*** -0.052***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
Green -0.112*** -0.114*** -0.092*** -0.089***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Orange 0.253*** 0.252*** 0.092*** 0.093***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Red 0.407*** 0.407*** -0.210*** -0.211***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026)
Female -0.035*** -0.035*** 0.103*** 0.104***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Age 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 222338 222338 197219 197219
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results of an LPM on discharge destinations. Results
use data from the emergency department of a Lisbon hospital, from Jan
2011-Oct 2012. Standard errors are cluster-robust at the hour level and
shown in parentheses. All models include fixed effects at the Year-Month-




Our dataset does not allow us to analyze the impact of doctors’ behavior on patient’s health out-
comes. Nevertheless, many studies (summarized in a meta-analysis by Hoot and Aronsky 2008)
show that ED crowding out is correlated with adverse patient health outcomes, such as mortal-
ity. For this reason, we repeat the analysis using waiting times as the outcome variable, in Ta-
ble 1.7.
The first column tells that one extra person waiting in the ED at the time of check in increases
waiting time by 1.67%, on average. At an average queue at check-in of 19.4 patients, the estimates
point at an elasticity of waiting time with respect to the queue of 0.32. The second column shows
that this effect is true only if the marginal patient shares the same urgency classification, when
the effect is stronger and statistically distinguishable from zero. The coefficient for the impact of
the queue of different urgency is estimated at a value very close to zero. This result together with
those of the length of stay analysis indicate that the arrival of an extra patient of different urgency
level does not affect waiting times but may impact their length of stay, after being called to see a
doctor. The last column displays the heterogeneity results, which show that the positive effect of
queues on waiting times is decreasing with the level of urgency. The result is to be expected since
more severe conditions such as heart attacks cannot wait for treatment. In fact, only the two least
severe colors, blue and green, present a statistically significant and positive coefficient, while the
remaining three cannot be statistically distinguished from zero.
Overall, we find evidence that queues lead to higher waiting times, but the effect is very heteroge-
neous across urgency levels.
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Table 1.7: Waiting time
Dependent variable: Log(Waiting Time)
Queue at check-in/10 0.167*** 0.073
(0.052) (0.045)
Same urgency queue at check-in/10 0.360***
(0.066)
Different urgency queue at check-in/10 -0.020
(0.041)
Queue at check-in/10 × Blue 0.013*
(0.007)
Queue at check-in/10 × Green 0.017***
(0.004)
Queue at check-in/10 × Orange -0.015***
(0.002)
Queue at check-in/10 × Red -0.015***
(0.005)
Blue 0.962*** 1.122*** 0.712***
(0.069) (0.092) (0.156)
Green 0.470*** 0.199*** 0.136**
(0.027) (0.023) (0.058)
Orange -0.960*** -0.757*** -0.666***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.036)
Red -1.170*** -0.955*** -0.879***
(0.050) (0.052) (0.077)
Female 0.087** 0.084** 0.087***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Age 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results for the effects of queues on waiting times, using the
number of arrivals in the previous 60 minutes as an instrument. In this regression
queues are measured at the time of check in. The first column presents the aver-
age queue coefficient, while column 2 separates the effects into equal and differ-
ent urgency queues. The third column shows the heterogeneous effects by iter-
ating queue with urgency level, using “yellow” as the benchmark color. Results
use a total of 276,061 arrivals in the emergency department of a Lisbon hospital,
from Jan 2011-Oct 2012. Standard errors are cluster-robust at the hour level and
shown in parentheses. All models include fixed effects at the Year-Month-Day-
Hour level (15,801 levels). First stage F-stats: 399.78 (column 1); 486.93 and
493.62 (column 2); 929.61, 53.14, 92.68, 49.43 and 46.61 (column 3).
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1.5 Robustness Checks
In this section we run several checks that show the robustness of our estimates, which can be
found in the online appendix, Appendix A.2. We start by changing our instrument, using only
visits with an urgency level ranging from yellow to red, because these are, arguably, the ones that
are exogenous to consumer choice (Table A.4). We find that the coefficient of the impact of the
queue on the Log(LOS) is of similar magnitude (-0.277 instead of our benchmark of -0.286), and
the result that the extensive margin drives the OOP results holds true. We also change the time
interval of the instrument, by using arrivals in the previous 15, 30, and 90 minutes (Table A.5).
This exercise shows that the F-stat of the first stage and the coefficient estimates decrease as we
widen the time interval of the instrument. The elasticities at the mean queue size (14.6) range
between -0.38 and -0.5.
We also separate our regression between day and night effects, as the capacity constraints might
be very different between the two time periods, and find that our estimates are driven mostly by
day-period patients (Table A.6). Finally, we run a model specification that controls for the age
of patients in a flexible manner, given that age and health status might not be related linearly
(Figure A.4). Results show a monotonic impact of age on LOS and OOP, and the queue coefficient
is robust to this change.
1.6 Conclusion
Physicians working in hospital Emergency Departments are often faced with surges in demand. In
such circumstances they need to readily adapt, optimizing the resources spent with each patient. In
practice this means that whenever the ED is (unpredictably) crowded, doctors may redefine their
allocation of resources by decreasing the amount of tests and time spent with each patient.
Using an instrumental variable strategy along with a fixed-effects model, we provide causal ev-
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idence that physicians treat patients less intensively in periods of spiking demand. The interval
between being first seen by the doctor and discharge decreases when more patients are queuing
in the waiting room, as does the likelihood of being sent to further diagnosis and treatment after
seeing the doctor. Also, patients are more likely to be discharged from the hospital instead of being
admitted to inpatient care.
Rationing both time and lab tests is not bad per se, and whether it has negative health consequences
is an empirical question that depends on the health production function. We do not test the health
outcomes coming from variation in arrivals since our data does not allow us to check readmissions
or deaths in a reliable way. Nevertheless, our results do suggest that health impacts might be a
valuable topic for further analysis, as we find evidence that arrivals are linked to changes in waiting
times, known to be correlated with adverse health outcomes (Hoot and Aronsky 2008). This paper
focuses, instead, on studying a mechanism through which ED visits and health outcomes can be
linked - the physicians’ role - and leaves the assessment of its consequences for future research. It
is encouraging that we find some evidence that physicians ration efficiently, in the sense that they
decrease treatment more intensively for patients without urgent conditions, whose health impacts
are more likely to be small.
Overall, our study has important policy implications. Our results show that doctors react to ca-
pacity constraints and, therefore, policies aimed at changing the amount of resources available to
the hospital need to account for doctors’ reactions. For example, hiring additional doctors in order
to decrease waiting times might have a lower than expected impact if the infra-marginal doctors







A bed constraint? Occupancy rates and
hospital readmissions
2.1 Introduction
Universal provision of health care is one of the main foundations of European modern societies.
However, generating sufficient hospital capacity to guarantee everyone receives ideal treatment at
any given time is a sensitive matter. Since demand for health care is unpredictable, the optimal level
of capacity must balance potential health consequences of peak-load times against the opportunity
cost of resources under idle times. Consequently, it is common for public hospitals to experience
unexpected demand fluctuations that lead to acute bed shortages (Bagust, Place and Posnett, 1999;
Bain et al., 2010; Green and Nguyen, 2001; Gorunescu, McClean and Millard, 2002; Bekker and
Koeleman, 2011). When hospitals are full and resources are insufficient, operational failures are
likely to occur (Epstein et al., 2012; Tucker, 2004). Importantly, doctors’ decisions regarding ad-
missions and discharges may be affected by the pressure to clear beds and admit patients in urgent
need of hospitalization (Blom et al., 2014b). For example, physicians may decide to admit only
severe patients, or discharge patients prematurely to make room for other patients.
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Intuitively, physicians, who decide the quantity of resources to apply based on the characteristics
of the patients and service constraints, may have to ration resources, such as their own time, to treat
more people (Clark and Olsen, 1994; Cutler, 1993; Whynes, 1996). Time constraints drive doctors
to optimize based on a time-quality trade-off (Anand, Paç and Veeraraghavan, 2011; Dugdale,
Epstein and Pantilat, 1999). For instance, they may decrease the length of stay during critical
periods to make room for more admissions (Bagust, Place and Posnett, 1999; Forster et al., 2003;
McCarthy et al., 2009; Thomas and Holloway, 1991). These choices are important, as time spent
with patients is related to positive health outcomes (Ogden et al., 2004; Chen, Farwell and Jha,
2009; Silver, 2016).
Occupancy rates have been found to be correlated with negative outcomes in emergency depart-
ments, particularly in intensive care units (Chrusch et al., 2009; Gattinoni et al., 2004; Boden
et al., 2015; McCusker et al., 2014). They are also related with emergency department length of
stay (Bagust, Place and Posnett, 1999; Forster et al., 2003; McCarthy et al., 2009). Finally, the
association between occupancy rates and readmission episodes is mixed, switching from positive
(Chrusch et al., 2009; Durbin et al., 2007; Blom et al., 2015), to negative or non conclusive (Blom
et al., 2014b,a), depending on the type of hospital or department, and the type of readmission in-
terval chosen (e.g., 30 days vs. 72 hours readmission).
Understanding the effects of high occupancy rates is fundamental to gauge their potential costs
and, if needed, appropriately design policies to tackle inefficiencies. For that purpose I assess
whether demand-supply mismatches impact the quality of inpatient care. Moreover, I distinguish
the effects by age groups, giving special emphasis to the elderly population. I use readmission
episodes as a quality measure (Benbassat and Taragin, 2000), thus aiming at defining the effects
of occupancy levels (number of patients per number of beds) on the likelihood of readmission
episodes in Hospitals of the Portuguese National Health Service (NHS).
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In this study I use data on the Portuguese Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG), provided by the Por-
tuguese Central Administration of the Health System (ACSS), containing anonymized individual-
level data on all discharges in Portuguese public hospitals. I look at how occupancy rates, and
respective variation, in days prior to patients’ discharge, are associated with readmission episodes.
I leverage my analysis on a fixed effects model to exploit a fine variation in weekly occupancy rates
taking place in each hospital, while accounting for the DRG associated with each discharge and its
level of severity. Additionally, I perform a cross-age comparison to determine if the impacts are
constant across different age groups. Finally, I address the relation between occupancy rates and
early discharges, using exogenous thresholds of length of stay. My analysis provides important
insights regarding the consequences of occupancy rates on the provision of inpatient care. At the
same time, it addresses potential inequalities of care provision on different age groups.
Results show that occupancy rates faced by patients in one and two days prior to discharge cause
the likelihood of future readmissions episodes to go up. The same happens when occupancy vari-
ation is used instead of its level. Results are driven by the older groups, which tells that the phe-
nomenon affects especially the frailer population. The length of stay threshold analysis suggests
higher probability of readmission for patients discharged below the expected length of stay for a
given level of severity of a given DRG, indicating early discharges as the main cause. Again, the
result is driven by the older age groups in the sample.
This paper is close to Blom et al. 2015, as I also assess the effects of occupancy on 30 days read-
missions. I contribute to the literature by defining this relation for Portuguese public hospitals,
where physicians do not have any performance-related financial incentive, using a finely detailed
fixed effects model. Also, I go deeper in the analysis of potential early discharges, providing fur-
ther explanation to the main findings. Finally, I study health care access inequalities by identifying
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the most vulnerable age groups. This information is useful to policy makers, as for instance, they
can conclude that when occupancy rates increase, physicians need to be especially careful when
discharging older patients with below expected length of stay.
The paper is presented in the following order: Section 2.2 provides a brief institutional context
for the inpatient care services in the Portuguese NHS. Section 2.3 presents and explains the data
and the relevant variables. Section 2.4 debates the methodology adopted. Section 2.5 exhibits
and discusses the results of the effects of occupancy rates on readmission episodes. Section 2.6
discusses the relation between occupancy and length of stay and Section 2.7 provides additional
results. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Institutional context
The Portuguese health care system is primarily characterized by a universal National Health Ser-
vice (NHS)1, that is regulated at the federal level. A comprehensive description of the Portuguese
health care system can be found in Barros, Machado and Simões 2011.
All residents in Portugal are covered by the NHS, irrespective of their socioeconomic, employ-
ment or legal status. The access to the public inpatient care service is usually made through the
emergency care department for acute conditions, or through general consultations with specialized
physicians for non-acute conditions. In urgent cases, individuals are admitted to the nearest hospi-
tal, unless the hospital has no specialized department with the ability to treat a specific condition.
In that case, the patient is readily transferred to a specialized hospital. In less urgent cases, derived
from non-acute care, the patient is normally admitted to the hospital in her area of residence, in
which she was being followed by a specialty doctor.
1The public sector accounts for about 80% of emergency care and more than 70% of total hospitalizations and
surgeries, according to the Portuguese Institute of Statistics (INE).
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After being hospitalized, the length of stay of each patient is defined by the doctor responsible for
the treatment. Independently of the period of hospitalization, there is no user charge, and therefore
the service is considered free.2
Hospital budgets are drawn up and allocated by the Ministry of Health through the Central Admin-
istration of the Health System (ACSS). Public hospitals are allocated a global budget using DRGs
to adjust the prospective budget for case-mix and other hospital specificities. This need of col-
lecting individual-level data for DRG grouping purposes has significantly improved the hospitals’
information system.3
NHS doctors are salaried government employees with a fixed salary that depends on the category
and duration of service. There is no pay for performance schemes in inpatient care, which means
doctors have no financial incentives. Still, it is possible for doctors to work both in the public
and private sector. Currently, there are three employment levels for doctors: full-time, but not
exclusive, full-time with exclusive NHS employment, and part-time. Full-time practitioners need
to work 40 hours in a week.
The public system owns 48 institutions that are separated in 4 different groups: hospital centers,
general hospitals, specialized hospitals and local units of health (ULS). The hospital centers are
clusters of hospitals with functional connections under the same administration. General hospitals
are stand-alone hospitals with their own management. They provide mostly the same services as
the hospitals in the hospital centers. Specialized hospitals focus on a limited number of services,
usually associated with specific types of conditions (e.g. oncology, psychiatry or ophthalmology).
Finally, local units of health integrate several services of the health system such as hospital care
and primary care.
Among the 48 institutions, there are currently eight medical schools in Portugal, two in Lisbon,
two in Oporto and one in Coimbra, Braga, Covilhã and Algarve).
2Payments to the NHS are made indirectly, through taxes.




The data was provided by the Portuguese Central Administration of the Health System (ACSS)
and contains yearly collected DRGs’ (Diagnosis Related Groups) data for all admissions in the
Portuguese public health institutions. Importantly, each patient is associated with an identifica-
tion code, thus allowing me to find readmission episodes. I collected a complementary data-set to
account for the monthly number of beds in each hospital, available in the institutional site of ACSS.
The DRG data-set contains information that identifies hospitals, date of admission, type of admis-
sion4, date of discharge, type of discharge5, transfer motives 6, and diagnoses. It also includes age,
gender and place of residence of the patient.
The initial sample is comprised of all individuals hospitalized in all hospital centers of the Por-
tuguese NHS and whose discharge date lies between the 1st of January of 2014 and the 31th of
December of 2016.
Outpatient care is dropped from the sample because admissions are scheduled in advance, mean-
ing demand is predictable. Also, they mostly compete for different resources within the hospital. I
also exclude December of every year because of the impossibility of counting readmission episodes
generated during that month, due to data structure7. Finally, I keep only the seven biggest Major
Categories of Diagnosis in the sub-sample, after excluding childbirth related episodes. The final
sample contains 41 hospital centers and roughly 1.7 million hospitalizations.
4Planned, unplanned, hospitalization or ambulatory.
5Ordered, or not, by a physician
6Follow up, lack of equipment, long-term care, etc...
7Patient identifier does not transition across years
42
In the scope of this truncated data-set, the sample individuals average 63 years of age, with a slight
discrepancy in gender in favor of men (52.12%).
The seven MDC (Major Diagnosis Categories) included in the sub-sample are the respiratory sys-
tem (19.01%), circulatory system (17.96%), musculoskeletal system (17.06%), digestive system
(15.12%), nervous system (11.22%), urinary system (10.81%) and hepatobiliary system (8.83%).
In the Portuguese NHS, patients are not allowed, at the time of the data, to decide in which hos-
pital they want to be treated, being automatically sent to be hospitalized in either their hospital of
residency or the nearest hospital, in case of emergency.
2.3.2 Readmission episodes:
I built the readmission variable using individuals’ identification codes. The numerical identifica-
tion codes associated with each patient allow me to trace the people treated in the NHS’s hospitals,
and therefore to count re-hospitalizations. Readmissions occur when patients are re-hospitalized
following a previous hospitalization (index admission). I use two approaches when counting read-
missions, and both with a 30 days threshold8. Despite some debate, this definition has been widely
used in the literature (Benbassat and Taragin, 2000; Boulding et al., 2011; Blom et al., 2015).
First, I adapt the Medicare definition, considering all admissions, independently of the cause, to
constitute readmissions if they happen within 30 days after discharge on a first admission. This
method will be called the standard approach. Second, I count readmission episodes when the time
condition is met (30 days) and the readmission’s MDC is the same as the index admission. In this
scenario, readmissions are more likely to be related with the initial admission. This method will
be called the conservative approach. Both methods have into account cross hospital admissions as
8Admissions separated by more than one month are unlikely to be related.
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long as they are unplanned.9
Readmissions are counted at the index admission, so it is possible to study the association be-
tween occupancy rates and future readmission episodes.10 Moreover, readmission episodes are
only counted if discharges associated with the index admissions were ordered by a physician and
the readmissions are unplanned11.
In the conservative approach, readmissions amount to 3.91% of the sample, while in the standard
approach they represent 7.75% of the total observations. The respiratory system (13.5%), the uri-
nary system (12%) and the hepatobiliary system (11%) are the MCDs with higher readmission
rates, in the standard approach. In the conservative approach, the highest readmission rates occur
in the musculoskeletal system (12%), respiratory system (8%), and the hepatobiliary system (7%).
For hospitals, using the standard approach, the data shows a maximum of 10.5% average readmis-
sion rate in a hospital center located in the middle interior of the country. The minimum value, 4%,
belongs to a small hospital in an occidental part of the northern region of Portugal. The median
hospital in terms of readmission rates presents a value of 6.80% and is located in the city of Lisbon.
Importantly, the month of December is excluded because the identification code is lost across
years. As an example, if a patient were to be discharge in December 31th and then readmitted in
January, the identification code would be different, which prevents the identification of the patient
and consequently counting the readmission episode.
9Cross hospital admissions are accounted as potential readmissions if they are not transfers.
10The existence of a time gap avoids the possibility of reverse causality.
11The data provides a code stating whether an admission was urgent or previously scheduled.
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2.3.3 Occupancy rates:
The information concerning the dates of admission and discharge of the patients allow me to
build variables of occupancy in each hospital of the Portuguese NHS. The ratios of occupancy are
calculated by counting the number of patients hospitalized in each day of the year dividing by the
number of beds12, in the respective hospitals. Figure 2.1 illustrates the evolution of occupancy
rates along the three years contemplated by this study.





















Note: This figure shows the evolution of the average occupancy rates that patients’
experienced in their last day of hospitalization in all months of the years in the analysis
(2014, 2015 and 2016).
The graph displays what seems to be a negative trend within each year for all years in analysis.
12I use the variable in its ratio format, which means that 0.8 corresponds to 80% occupancy rate.
45
August is consistently the lowest occupancy rate month because it is traditionally a month of
vacations.
I measure occupancy just before the discharge date, that is, in the last day of hospitalization, or
alternatively, in the days just prior to discharge. The measures aim at capturing potential effects
where sudden peaks in occupancy cause early discharges.
In the data, the average rate of occupancy at discharge is 0.9731 (97.31%). This number indicates
that, on average, Portuguese patients are likely to find very crowded hospitals during their hospi-
talization. The results, however are an overestimation of the real value13. This happens because the
measure counts individuals that were in the hospital in a given day. Some patients may not overlap
their stay, but are still counted as such.14 If a patient is discharged in the morning and another
patient is admitted during the afternoon, then they faced different occupancy rates, even though
they are being counted together. Therefore, there is a problem of double counting that inflates the
values. Still, since the direction of the measurement error is known, the overestimation does not
compromise the qualitative conclusions. Moreover, the analysis includes a turnover rate to account
for that problem. The turnover rate is the sum of admissions and discharges on the day of interest,
and it is expected to capture how busy the hospital was, filtering the occupancy variable from the
double counting issue.
Finally, I also compute the variation in occupancy which is I use throughout this study to comple-
ment the main analysis. The variation in the occupancy rate is computed by subtracting the number
of admissions and discharges in a given day, in a each hospital.
13The occupancy rates should be approximately 5 percentage points lower, according to data in ACSS’s institutional
site.




Regression analysis is used to assess the potential relation between the negative outcomes and
the capacity variables. My main hypothesis is that doctors force discharges in periods of greater oc-
cupancy, therefore increasing the likelihood of early discharging and consequently the probability
of readmission. The general model I use to test this theory is written in the following way:
yiht = α + βOccupancyiht + γXith + θDRGi × Severityi + τy × τm × τw × τh + εiht (2.1)
The dependent variable, yiht, is a binary variable stating whether discharge i, in hospital h, with
discharge at time t (day), generated a readmission. The main explanatory variable, Occupancyiht,
contains occupancy-rate related variables for discharge i in hospital h at day t. I conduct experi-
ments using the occupancy variable as either occupancy at discharge, occupancy one day before
discharge, occupancy two days before discharge and occupancy three days before discharge15. I
also use occupancy variation rates in a complementary analysis.
The interaction τy × τm × τw × τh provides weekly fixed effects interacted with hospital fixed
effects, meaning that the model studies a very fine variation in readmission episodes in a given
week of the year in a specific hospital. Variable DRGit stands for the respective diagnosis related
groups’ fixed effects. The interaction between week and hospital accounts for seasonal variation
and epidemics, and hospital characteristics. DRGs’ fixed effects are used to control for cross di-
agnosis severity. They are interacted with four levels of severity16 to provide a finer control for the
patient’s condition.
15The lags stop at three days before discharge because it is unlikely that physicians decide discharges sooner than
that.
161-low, 2-medium, 3-high, 4-extreme.
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Vector Xith contains a gender variable, age groups, number of procedures and a daily turnover
rate. The number of procedures aims at further accounting for severity. The daily turnover rate
is a variable with the sum of the number of admissions and discharges in the day in which pa-
tient i is discharged, as a proportion of total patients that where in the hospital that day. Variable
genderi is a dummy taking value 0 if the individual is female. Variable ageit is composed of age
intervals of 5 years from 0 to 10 and 10 years from the age of 10 to 90. Individuals older than 90
are grouped in the last interval. Age is measured in groups since the effect is likely to be non-linear.
The analysis starts with evaluating occupancy at discharge day, in line with Blom et al. 2015 and
then continues testing the lags of the variable. The latter assumes that physicians decide discharges
beforehand, and thus the results are likely to be more prevalent in the days prior to discharge. The
model is estimated using a Linear Probability Model (LPM) to more easily accommodate the high
degree of fixed effects. The out of bound predictions in the main estimations amount to less than
3%.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Occupancy in the day of discharge
Table 1 shows the average marginal effects of occupancy rates at the day of discharge (following
Blom et al. 2015) on the probability of readmission.
In the two approaches, results show that being discharged in a day with higher occupancy rates is
not affecting readmissions. The estimates are small and non-statistically significant.
However, the daily turnover rate has a positive relation with the probability of readmission. A 10
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Table 2.1: Main Estimates on the Probability of Readmission
Dependent variable: Readmission
Standard Conservative Standard Conservative
Occupancy at Discharge 0.008 0.008
(0.008) (0.005)
Turnover Rate 0.053*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.002)
Occupancy Rate Variation -0.107*** -0.059***
(0.006) (0.005)
Male 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Procedures 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age [5-10] -0.007** -0.000 -0.007** -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age [10-20] -0.007** -0.001 -0.007** -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age [20-30] -0.011*** -0.005** -0.010*** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age [30-40] -0.015*** -0.007*** -0.014*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age [40-50] -0.014*** -0.006*** -0.013*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age [50-60] -0.009*** -0.004** -0.008*** -0.003*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age [60-70] -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age [70-80] 0.005** -0.001 0.006** -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age [80-90] 0.017*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age [90+] 0.021*** -0.001 0.021*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
R2 0.057 0.036 0.057 0.036
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results of the effects of occupancy rates at discharge on the prob-
ability of a readmission episode. Results use a total of 1,687,348 discharges in 41
Portuguese Public Hospitals, from 2014 to 2016. Standard errors are clustered at the
week level and shown in parenthesis. All models include fixed effects at the Year-
Month-Week-Hospital level (9,286 levels) and DRG-Severity fixed effects (595).
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percentage point increase in the turnover rate would lead to an increase in the probability of read-
mission of 0.5 and 0.25 percentage points, in the standard and conservative approaches, respec-
tively. Both explain roughly 5% of the respective readmission rates (at rates 8.94% and 4.49%).
The results suggest that busier days are positively related to the likelihood of readmission episodes.
The occupancy rate variation, in the two last columns, states that patients discharged in a day when
hospital occupancy rates have increased have a lower probability of readmission. One possible
interpretation is that days with very high number discharges, and consequently negative variation
in occupancy, are associated with higher probability of readmission.
The gender marginal effects indicate that men are more likely to be readmitted than women. Men
have a higher probability of readmission between 0.6 and 0.8 percentage points, on average, de-
pending on the methodology. The result is robust across all specifications of the model presented
in this manuscript.
The number of procedures impacts readmission probability positively, with individuals that are
subject to an extra procedure experiencing an increase in the probability of being readmitted of 0.2
percentage points, in the standard approach. Naturally, more severe cases are associated with both
a higher number of procedures and a higher readmission probability.
Finally, the age interval coefficients in this LPM shows that the probability of readmission in-
creases with age. As people get older, they become frailer, taking longer to recover. This result
holds in the standard approach but not in the conservative approach.
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2.5.2 Occupancy before discharge
In this section, I test a different explanatory variable. Instead of occupancy in the day of discharge
(more common in the literature), I look at the effect of the occupancy variable before discharge.
The hypothesis underlying this test is that doctors decide about discharges in advance. Thus, oc-
cupancy variables before discharge should be more important on explaining discharging decisions
than occupancy variables in the discharge day itself.
Table 2.2 displays the results using occupancy one day before discharge as the explanatory vari-
able. The results using occupancy rate two and three days before discharge are shown in appendix,
in Table B.1 and Table B.2.
Table 2.2: Main Estimates on the Probability of Readmission
Dependent variable: Readmission
Standard Conservative Standard Conservative
Occupancy One Day Before Discharge 0.070*** 0.036***
(0.008) (0.006)
Turnover Rate t-1 -0.006* -0.002
(0.003) (0.002)
Occupancy Rate Variation t-1 0.041*** 0.015**
(0.007) (0.004)
Male 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Procedures 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.056 0.036 0.056 0.036
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results of the effects of occupancy rates one day before discharge on the
probability of a readmission episode. Results use a total of 1,687,348 discharges in 41 Portuguese
Public Hospitals, from 2014 to 2016. Standard errors are clustered at the week level and shown
in parenthesis. All models include fixed effects at the Year-Month-Week-Hospital level (9,286
levels), age groups fixed effects (11) and DRG-Severity fixed effects (595).
Under this alternative, the coefficient on occupancy is statistically significant for both the standard
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and conservative approaches. According to the estimates, a 10 percentage point increase in the
occupancy rate one day before discharge leads to a 0.7 percentage point increase in the likelihood
of readmission, in the standard approach. In the conservative approach, the estimates tell that a 10
percentage point increase in the occupancy rate one day before discharge increases thereadmission
probability by 0.36 percentage points.
In terms of magnitude, a back of the envelope example shows that increasing occupancy by 10
percentage points, at marginal effects of 0.07 or 0.036, for 1,303,129 individuals in this sample,
with an average length of stay of 9.4 days and a hospitalization average cost per day of 880 euros17
yields an extra cost to the Portuguese NHS of 38.8 or 75.5 million euros in three years18, depending
on the approach chosen. The example is crude and purely illustrative. A more thorough financial
analysis would require the exact cost of each episode, which is not available.
The two last columns of Table 2.2, report the coefficients of the lagged variation in occupancy for
the two approaches. Contrary to the results found in Table 2.1, a higher variation in occupancy
positively affects readmissions. When variation in occupancy increases by 10 percentage points
the readmission probability increases by 0.15 and 0.41 percentage points in the conservative and
standard approach, respectively.
These results indicate that there is a positive relation between occupancy rates and readmissions,
but only prior to discharge. The findings suggest that doctors take into account the state of occu-
pancy of the hospital when taking discharging decisions which should occur at least one day before
the effective discharge. Physicians take into account not only the absolute value of occupancy in
that day, but also the observed variation in occupancy. This is consistent with my hypothesis that
they force discharges when hospitals are busier to make room for new patients, which increases
the probability of patient readmission.
17The value was computed by the Portuguese Health Regulator.
18The summed up value of 75.5 million euros in the standard approach for the three years in the analysis accounts
for roughly 0.05% of the 2016 Portuguese GDP.
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Table B.1 and Table B.2, in the appendix, present the same estimation for occupancy two and
three days before discharge. The results for occupancy are smaller when measured two days be-
fore discharge (but are still positive and statistically significant).When looking at three days before
discharge, the coefficient on occupancy is negative and not significant. In terms of occupancy
variation, the two-days lag shows higher coefficients than the one-day lag. The three-days lag co-
efficients are also positive and statistically significant, but lower than the other two. Summarizing,
early discharge decisions depend mostly on how occupancy rates are evolving two days before
discharge (occupancy variation) and how they fare, in absolute terms, one day before discharge
(occupancy rate).
2.5.3 Occupancy rates by intervals
So far, the effect of occupancy rates on the probability of readmission has been studied assuming
a continuous effect. However, it is likely that occupancy rates only matter past a critical threshold,
when medical time becomes a scarce resource. For example, occupancy rates below 80% should
not be problematic (Bagust, Place and Posnett, 1999), as the hospital is relatively empty. Thus
comparing 70% occupancy with 80% occupancy rates should not show significant effects on read-
mission probabilities. But comparing 90% occupancy rate and 100% occupancy rate is likely to
provide meaningful results. In that regard, this section evaluates the hypothesis that occupancy
rates affect readmission episodes in a non-linear fashion. So, instead of using continuous variables
of occupancy, Table 2.3 presents regression results by intervals.
Results in Table 2.3 show that occupancy intervals evaluated one day before discharge have a
weakly increasing effect on readmission rates, with the higher interval presenting the highest co-
efficients in all specifications. The interval of 110% and above has a coefficient of 0.014 in the
standard approach and 0.008 in the conservative approach. This implies that a patient discharged
under those circumstances is 1.4 or 0.8 percentage points more likely to be readmitted when com-
pared to a patient whose occupancy one day before discharge was below 85%. These values are
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Table 2.3: Main Estimates on the Probability of Readmission
Dependent variable: Readmission
Standard Conservative Standard Conservative
Occupancy Rate > 110% t-1 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.019*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Occupancy Rate [105%, 110%] t-1 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Occupancy Rate [100%, 105%] t-1 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Occupancy Rate [95%, 100%] t-1 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Occupancy Rate [90%, 95%] t-1 0.003 0.003** 0.003* 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Occupancy Rate [85%, 90%] t-1 0.006*** 0.003* 0.007*** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Turnover Rate t-1 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Occupancy Rate Variation t-1 0.068*** 0.029***
(0.007) (0.005)
Male 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Procedures 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.056 0.036 0.057 0.036
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results of the effects of different occupancy intervals on the probability
of a readmission episode. The interval of 0% to 85% is the base interval. Results use a to-
tal of 1,687,348 discharges in 41 Portuguese Public Hospitals, from 2014 to 2016. Standard
errors are clustered at the week level and shown in parenthesis. All models include fixed ef-
fects at the Year-Month-Week-Hospital level (9,286 levels), age groups fixed effects (11) and
DRG-Severity fixed effects (595).
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respectively 15.7% and 17.8% of total readmission probability.
The results for occupancy rate variation are shown in the appendix, in Appendix B.1, in Figure B.1
and Figure B.2. They show that occupancy rate variation one day before discharge is only relevant
in predicting readmissions if occupancy rate is high enough (greater than 85%).
2.5.4 Occupancy and readmission by age groups
My second objective is to determine if there is treatment inequality across age. To find out, I
perform individual regressions per age group. The model is estimated in a similar fashion to the one
described by Equation (2.1). The explanatory variable is occupancy one day before discharge. A
complementary approach looks at occupancy variation one day before discharge. The coefficients
on the occupancy and variation variables for each age group are depicted in Figure 2.2, using the
standard approach. The figure for the corresponding conservative approach is in Figure B.3, in the
appendix.
The figure shows that readmission episodes associated with occupancy rates at discharge may be
attributed to older patients. In fact, only the age groups over 50 years of age present positive and
statistically significant coefficients. All the other groups have statistically non-significant coeffi-
cients, and some are negative. The variation coefficients also present a similar trend. After 30
years, they are increasing with age. The curve however is not as steep as the occupancy one.
The combined results provide evidence that there is inequality in the outcomes across age groups.
Older people lose more by being discharged when occupancy rates are high and increasing, as their
chance of readmission is higher.
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Note: The figure shows the effects of occupancy rate and occupancy varia-
tion one day before patient’s discharge on the likelihood of readmission by
age, using the standard approach.
2.6 Length of stay
2.6.1 Length of Stay and Occupancy
The hypothesis established in this paper for the effect of high occupancy rates on readmissions
says that sudden demand spikes can lead to early discharges which in turn lead to worse health
outcomes. Therefore, a complete analysis must evaluate the relation between occupancy rates and
patients’ length of stay, and the consequent effect on readmissions.
First, I run the model in Equation (2.1) with length of stay (measured in days) as the dependent
variable. Table 2.4 shows that occupancy variables are related with higher length of stay. Occu-
pancy one day before discharge has positive coefficients, suggesting that patients discharged when
capacity is limited tend to experience larger periods of hospitalization. In column (1), a 10 per-
centage point increase in occupancy one day before discharge is associated with roughly half a day
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Table 2.4: Main Estimates on the Length of Stay
Dependent variable: Length of Stay
(1) (2)
Occupancy One Day Before Discharge 4.205***
(0.317)
Turnover Rate t-1 -2.063***
(0.105)




Number of Procedures 1.000*** 0.999***
(0.007) (0.007)
Age [5-10] -0.473*** -0.478***
(0.059) (0.060)
Age [10-20] -0.420*** -0.422***
(0.073) (0.073)
Age [20-30] -0.438*** -0.442***
(0.096) (0.097)
Age [30-40] -0.263*** -0.268***
(0.072) (0.072)
Age [40-50] 0.028 0.023
(0.070) (0.070)
Age [50-60] 0.388*** 0.384***
(0.066) (0.067)
Age [60-70] 0.694*** 0.687***
(0.064) (0.065)
Age [70-80] 0.799*** 0.793***
(0.067) (0.067)
Age [80-90] 0.772*** 0.766***
(0.072) (0.073)
Age [90+] 0.027 0.027
(0.078) (0.078)
R2 0.219 0.219
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results of the effects of occupancy rates one day
before discharge on patient’s length of stay (in days). Results use
a total of 1,687,348 discharges in 41 Portuguese Public Hospitals,
from 2014 to 2016. Standard errors are clustered at the week level
and shown in parenthesis. All models include fixed effects at the
Year-Month-Week-Hospital level (9,286 levels) and DRG-Severity
fixed effects (595).
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more of length of stay. Occupancy variation one day before discharge follows the same trend. In
column (2), an increase in 10 percentage points in occupancy rate variation leads to almost one full
day of additional length of stay.
The results may seem counter-intuitive, as the hypothesis of early discharges suggests that it would
be more natural to observe shorter length of stay for patients discharged when occupancy rates are
high. However, it is possible that results are a product of reverse causality. Intuitively, physicians
may try to optimize discharges by sending home patients who have been in the hospital for a
longer period. Alternatively, patients who stayed in the hospital for longer may have suffered from
more severe conditions even withing their reported DRG and lever of severity. In a situation where
doctors have to make room for new admissions, they could choose to discharge patients with longer
length of stay, conditional on their severity level. The result is consistent with Martins and Filipe
2020, who say that doctors decrease length of stay for lower urgency patients in emergency care,
when the emergency department is more crowded. In an inpatient care setup, the same type of
decision making may be expected.
As before, the analysis can be decomposed into age groups, indicating who are the people being
caught up in the mechanism of discharges due to high occupancy rates. Results are presented in
Figure 2.3. The figure shows that older people discharged at higher occupancy rates one day prior
to discharge are more likely to have higher length of stay. It is possible that doctors, when faced
with higher occupancy rates, decide to discharge patients who have been hospitalized for longer.
Some of these patients may be older individuals, who, in general, need more time to get better for
a given illness and therefore have stayed in the hospital for longer.
A joint analysis of this last figure and Figure 2.2, from Section 2.5.4, seems to imply that because
the elderly stay in the hospital for longer they are more prone to being discharged when occupancy
rates are higher and thus, they have a higher chance of readmission. However, the methodology
so far has not presented any evidence that the patients with higher length of stay are the ones
more likely to return to the hospital. Also, it is hard to say if readmissions are caused by early
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Note: This figure shows the effects of occupancy rate one day before pa-
tient’s discharge on the length of stay.
discharges, as length of stay is not enough to determine if the patient left the hospital earlier than
recommended. The next section tackles this issue using exogenous thresholds of length of stay for
DRG and level of severity.
2.6.2 Length of stay by thresholds
In this subsection, I aim at determining if the results in previous sections are a product of early
discharges. Determining whether a patient was discharged sooner than recommended is a compli-
cated affair. Even physicians may diverge in opinion if presented specific cases of potential early
discharges. That said, I opted for a very objective approach, relying on exogenous thresholds to
evaluate the effect of occupancy variables on patients within different categories of length of stay.
I use the table, defined by the Portuguese law that prices inpatient episodes 19, which depends on
some intervals of length of stay, for each DRG and severity level. The intervals are divided in 5,
19Available in portaria Portaria n.º 254/2018.
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sequentially called minimum length of stay, below expected length of stay, above expected length
of stay, superior length of stay and maximum length of stay. They are set ex-ante by the Portuguese
authorities, which makes them independent of the length of stay observed in the data. Interacting
each interval with the occupancy variables tells, on average, how patients with observed higher
occupancy rates (or higher occupancy rate variation) one day before discharge had their proba-
bility of being readmitted change depending on their relative level of length of stay. Table 2.4
shows the results of occupancy variables interacted with thresholds of length of stay. The regres-
sion follows Equation (2.1) of section Section 2.4, only substituting the occupancy variable by the
aforementioned interaction variables.
Results show three important trends. First, patients discharged below expected length of stay, for
their DRG and respective severity level, see their likelihood of readmission increase if occupancy
variables increase. Specifically, for that group, an increase of 10 percentage points on occupancy
rates one day before discharge implies an increase in readmission probability of 0.2 and 0.35 per-
centage points, in the conservative and standard approaches, respectively. The coefficients are
higher for the variation variable, with an increase of 10 percentage points in occupancy variation
one day before discharge leading to an increase in the probability of readmission of 1.5 and 1 per-
centage points, in the conservative approach and standard approach, respectively. Second, positive
changes in occupancy variables one day before discharge negatively affect the readmission proba-
bility of patients whose length of stay is above expected. Third, increases in occupancy variables
increase the probability of readmission for patients with maximum length of stay. The coefficients
are not as large as the above expected length of stay group, but they are significant in all specifica-
tions.
The interaction between occupancy variables and below expected length of stay indicate that higher
occupancy variables do indeed cause early discharges, since this is the group suffering the most
in terms of readmission likelihood. The interaction between occupancy variables and above ex-
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Table 2.5: Main Estimates on the Length of Stay by Thresholds
Dependent variable: Readmission
Standard Conservative Standard Conservative
Occupancy t-1 & Max Limit Length 0.010*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001)
Occupancy t-1 & Superior Limit Length 0.008*** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Occupancy t-1 & Above Expected Length -0.055*** -0.029***
(0.001) (0.001)
Occupancy t-1& Below Expected Length 0.035*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001)
Occupancy t-1& Min Limit Length -0.037*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.002)
Turnover Rate t-1 0.021*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.001)
Variation t-1& Max Limit Length 0.151** 0.069*
(0.049) (0.029)
Variation t-1& Superior Limit Length 0.046 0.056*
(0.038) (0.025)
Variation t-1& Above Expected Length -0.143*** -0.106***
(0.038) (0.026)
Variation t-1& Below Expected Length 0.150*** 0.106***
(0.037) (0.027)
Variation t-1& Min Limit Length 0.116* 0.081*
(0.056) (0.038)
Male 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Procedures 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.059 0.037 0.056 0.036
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results of the effects of occupancy rates interacted with thresholds of occupancy
defined in the scope of the financing of the Portuguese Public Hospitals. The thresholds are defined
per DRG and severity level. Results use a total of 1,687,348 discharges in 41 Portuguese Public Hospi-
tals, from 2014 to 2016. Standard errors are clustered at the week level and shown in parenthesis. All
models include fixed effects at the Year-Month-Week-Hospital level (9,286 levels) and DRG-Severity
fixed effects (595).
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pected length of stay say that in this specific group occupancy rates cause no additional probability
of readmission, giving strength to the previous conclusion. Finally, the maximum limit of length
of stay is more puzzling, since its interaction with occupancy variables provides a positive coef-
ficient. Some likely scenarios could incorporate phenomena such as social hospitalization, i.e.,
patients who have nowhere to go and therefore must return to the hospital. Alternatively, it could
be due to extreme cases, such as accidents, where the number of complications go beyond what
can be expected or incorporated in a single diagnosis related group.
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Note: This figure shows the effects of occupancy rate one day before pa-
tient’s discharge on the likelihood of readmission by thresholds of length
of stay (for the respective DRG and severity level) and by age, using the
standard approach.
To shed some more light on what is behind the results, the regression in column 1 of Table 2.5
is repeated by aged groups, as defined previously in the model. Figure 2.4 shows the coefficients
of occupancy rate one day before discharge and respective confidence intervals for each group of
length of stay and each age group, in the standard approach. The respective graph for the conser-
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vative approach is in the appendix, in Figure B.4.
The positive coefficient for the maximum length of stay group is being driven by the younger
patients, hinting towards some very extreme occurrences, such as accidents. The opposite happens
on the above and below expected length of stay groups, since the older age groups are the ones
driving the coefficients in their respective directions. The elderly are more sensible to length of
stay, and discharging an older person before reaching the expected length of stay (conditional on
DRG and severity) creates a risk in the form of readmissions. Insufficient attention to this group is
driving more readmissions, causing inequalities in the access to inpatient care.
2.7 Other results
The large number of fixed effects is very important for identification purposes, but in the model
they are absorbed for computational reasons. In this section I provide more information about
time, hospital and MDC variables.
Appendix B.2, in the appendix, debates the effect that days of the week have on readmissions. The
section shows that there is a clear weekend effect with occupancy and readmissions decreasing
significantly in the weekends. Still, the effect does not translate into the relation between occu-
pancy and readmissions. The effect of occupancy rates one day before discharge is positive for all
days of the week. However, only the variables Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday present statistically
significant results, which implies that occupancy on Mondays, Tuesdays and Thursdays are driving
the results.
Table B.7 shows that occupancy rates one day before discharge are specially impactful in driving
readmission episodes in the months of January, February, April and July, with positive statistically
63
significant coefficients both in the standard and conservative approach. Occupancy variation one
day before discharge affects readmissions mostly in January, March, April and June, when the co-
efficients are statistically significant in both the standard and the conservative approach.
So far, I also did not disentangle the analysis by MDC. It is likely that hospital occupancy has
different effects on the readmission rates across health conditions. Table B.6, in Appendix B.2.1,
shows that the positive effects of occupancy rates one day before discharge on readmissions are
significant when considering conditions relating to the nervous, respiratory, circulatory, hepatic
and urinary systems. The coefficients are larger in the respiratory and hepatic system. The diges-
tive and musculoskeletal systems present positive but non-statistically significant coefficients.
Results may be further discriminated by hospitals characteristics. Appendix B.2.3 shows, in Fig-
ure B.5, Figure B.6 and Figure B.7, the differences between hospitals’ region, types and size. The
results in Section 2.5.2 are true across all hospital characteristics. The effects of occupancy rates
one day before discharge on the probability of readmission are positive for all hospital regions,
types and sizes. There are also no signs of heterogeneity between hospitals with different charac-
teristics.
2.8 Conclusions
Portuguese Hospitals have very high occupancy rates. This fact has two implications. On one
hand, it means that resources are not being wasted. On the other hand, they may not be sufficient to
respond to patients’ needs. I address the latter concern by performing a statistical quantification on
the relation between occupancy rates and readmission episodes. Using data from the Portuguese
DRGs for the years 2014, 2015 and 2016, I correlate occupancy variables experienced by patients
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during their hospitalization (in the form of occupancy rates and variation in occupancy rates) with
future readmission episodes. I leverage on a high number of fixed-effects model to look at variation
occurring within each week at each hospital.
The results show that occupancy rates, measured one and two days before discharge, lead to future
readmission episodes. The effects are stronger when evaluated at higher rates of occupancy and
for older individuals. Thus, it is fair to assume that the need to admit more people to a crowded
hospital likely forces doctors to discharge other patients. The hypothesis of early discharges is
confirmed using exogenous thresholds of length of stay, based on the Portuguese DRG pricing
scheme, to conclude that occupancy variation and occupancy rates affect the ones that have length
of stay below expected. Again, those are the ones belonging to an older age group, reinforcing the








Partners in care! Health effects of providing
care to spouses or partners
3.1 Introduction
Ageing of the population brings new challenges to developed countries. The increase in life ex-
pectancy comes with an increase in the number of years lived at latter stages of life and, conse-
quently, frailty. The lack of capacity to perform everyday tasks, due to the decline in physical and
mental capabilities, force the elderly to resort to the support of a third party: health professionals,
family members, friends or neighbors. This, and the fact that most people age eventually, makes
the phenomenon a societal issue that cannot be ignored. As such, policy makers around the globe
have been trying to assess the best ways of providing care to the elderly.
A lot of attention has been given to informal care, specially since researchers confirmed it to be
related to formal care, as a substitute or as a complement, depending on the situation (Van Houtven
and Norton, 2004; Bolin, Lindgren and Lundborg, 2008; Bonsang, 2009). This revelation, and
consequent necessity to compare both alternatives, motivated a plethora of studies on the pros and
cons of informal care.
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Informal caregiving can have positive altruism effects on caregivers. It is sometimes rewarding,
as it conveys the feeling that the caregiver is needed, increasing their sense of pride and self-
fulfillment (Pinquart and Sörensen, 2003; Brouwer et al., 2004, 2006).
Nonetheless, most of the findings dwell in the negative side of the activity. Taking care of a sick or
fragile person forces a burden on the persons caring, who have to dedicate extra time of their lives
to the act of providing help. Adding a new obligation to a daily routine of an individual may, in
some cases, affect negatively her quality of live. Also, it is likely to weaken her health condition, if
the routine becomes too overwhelming or if the health condition of the patient starts affecting the
mental state of the carer (Zarit, Reever and Bach-Peterson, 1980; Schulz and Beach, 1999; Vedhara
et al., 1999; Yaffe et al., 2002; Brouwer et al., 2004; Bobinac et al., 2010b; Do et al., 2015)). Not
only that, but the simple fact that a person dear to the carer is sick is enough to create an emotional
burden. In case of a family member, that effect is often referred in the literature as the family effect
(Brouwer et al., 1999; Bobinac et al., 2010b).
The burden of caregiving manifests in diverse forms which stem from functional to cognitive im-
pairments (Pinquart and Sörensen, 2003; Hiel et al., 2015). Physical problems have been found on
men as a cause of continued caregiving (Coe, Harold and Houtven, 2009). In terms of psychologi-
cal conditions, care recipients’ behavior and mood disturbance can impact caregiver quality of life
(Sewitch et al., 2004; Brouwer et al., 2004; Heger, 2017). For instance, a condition like depression
is associated with poor caregiver quality of life (Sewitch et al., 2004).
This paper is in line with studies evaluating the hazards of informal care. I try to assess the con-
sequences of providing personal care on the health outcomes of a very particular type of carers:
partners or spouses. Partner caregivers are a very special group in their characteristics. Unlike
other informal providers, spouses and partners tend to be about the same age as the care receiver
and live under the same roof. The type of tasks they perform exclusively as care providers, as well
as the associated burden, may differ from conventional children to parents informal caregiving
(Llácer et al., 2002). The care provided by spouses is an important mechanism which helps avoid-
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ing institutionalization, substituting or delaying formal long-term care (Nihtilä and Martikainen,
2008; Bakx and de Meijer, 2013). But co-residential care can lead to worst quality of life and
higher number of depressive symptoms (Barbosa and Matos, 2014).
I use data from the waves 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE), for people people aged 50 or older, to select a subsample of potential partner
caregivers based on the questions: “Is there someone living in this household whom you have
helped regularly during the last twelve months with personal care, such as washing, getting out of
bed, or dressing?” and “Who is that?”. The dataset presents a matching code for partners, therefore
allowing me the use partners’ variables for each observation. I look at single living couples and
compare partner caregivers with non-caregivers. The comparison is made using two distinct health
outcomes. I consider physical health and mental health. Physical health is measured by a self
reported measure and by a more robust disability index inspired by Bonsang 2009. For depression,
I use the EURO-D1 scale reported in SHARE.
I cannot perform the analysis without considering the possibility of family effects (Brouwer et al.,
1999; Bobinac et al., 2010a). Moreover, since I am looking at partners, there are other likely
health correlations across caregivers and care receivers. For instance, it is reasonable to think that
the Grossman Model (Grossman, 1972) can be extended to couples who live together. Partners
may share health investment decisions and health behaviors. Thus, people with lower health may
be married to people with lower health, frailer individuals may be married to frailer individuals,
etc... Therefore, partner caregivers are likely to be a selection of people with lower health, while
still enough to be caregivers. One typical solution to this problem is to use an arbitrary occurrence
that forces the individual in or out of caregiving. But sometimes those exogenous shocks with
no correlation with the characteristics of the partner caregivers are difficult to find, limited in
the number of observations, or just not available in the data. For that end, I include the health
1It is a depression scale present in the SHARE survey which is based on 12 objective questions about mental
health.
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characteristics of the patient in the model, in a first step, to help mitigating the health correlation
selection problems. Then, I perform an event study with pre-treatment matching (Schmitz and
Westphal, 2015) to study quasi-random transitions into spousal caregiving.
The static approach consists of regression analysis and matching. Due to the categorical nature of
the dependent variables, the first approach uses an ordered probit model for self assessed health
(SAH) and depression, and a generalized linear model with a probit link for the disability index.
The estimated coefficients on the partner providing personal care are all indicative of worst self
reported physical health and depression scales, when partner characteristics are not taken into
account. However, the inclusion of those variables, causes relevant changes in the results. In the
more complete methodology, partner caregivers display positive results on all health outcomes,
when compared with similar non-caregivers who have equally sick partners. The results show no
evident pattern across countries. They are robust to a matching strategy. Still, this approach only
proves that caregivers are better off, but it does not imply causality.
To that end, the event study compares individuals who transition into caregiving with the ones who
remain non-caregivers across waves of the survey. I match observations of both groups in the pre-
treatment period, on all individual and partner characteristics used across this study, to improve
the likelihood that transitions are random. The results of the subsequent regressions show only
positive results for self perceived physical health, and non-conclusive results for mental health and
disability index. Also, continued spousal caregiving has no impacts on providers health.
My analysis enters the literature of caregiver burden, particularly in the scope of low intensity
co-residential care. Its contribution comes from showing that household investment decisions on
health must be taken into account when searching for potential burden of partner caregiving. It
provides information to policy makers, saying that partner caregiving has positive effects on self
perceived physical health, and no negative effects on mental health or disability. So, they should
aim at understanding what drives the positive results, e.g. sentiment of self-fulfillment or changes
in reporting patterns, and promote partner caregiving under the right setup.
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In Section 3.2 the paper presents the data, in Section 3.3 the methodology, in Section 3.4 the results
and in Section 3.5 it looks at changes across waves. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data and summary statistics
I use data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), a multidis-
ciplinary and cross-national panel database of micro data on health, socio-economic status and
social and family networks for individuals aged 50 or older. SHARE covers 27 European Coun-
tries through 7 available waves of questionnaires2, at the time of this study. I use waves 1, 2, 4, 5
and 6, collected in 2004, 2007, 2011, 2013 and 2015, respectively.
To understand whether partner caregivers have different health outcomes due to their caring activ-
ities, I define two groups, individuals who provide personal care to their partners (treatment) and
individuals who do not provide any type of help to their partners (control). Single person house-
holds are excluded. Partner caregivers are determined by the question: “Is there someone living
in this household whom you have helped regularly during the last twelve months with personal
care, such as washing, getting out of bed, or dressing?”3 and “Who is that?”. If the individual
receiving help is the partner or the spouse, then I classify the individual as a partner caregiver. I
identify all other care provided at home, by checking if the partner received any formal (paid) care
or informal care from people outside the household or other household members and if the care
provider helped anyone else other than the partner. The survey provides a partner identification
code, that allows me to match partners. Also, partners are necessarily interviewed, guaranteeing I
have access to their answers.
Regarding the outcome variables, I look at physical and mental health outcomes, using physical
Self Assessed Health (SAH), Depression Scale and Disability Index. The SAH is based on the
2Not all countries are present in all waves.
3The variable is binary (yes or no) and there is no information about the amount of time spent providing personal
care.
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question “how do you rate your physical health on a scale from 1 to 5”. The Depression Scale
(Prince et al., 1999) ranges from 1 to 12 and is based on the evaluation of the following states
of mind: depression, pessimism, suicidality, guilt, sleep, interest, irritability, appetite, fatigue,
concentration, enjoyment and tearfulness. As a robustness check for physical health, I built a
disability index by running an Ordered Probit regression of the level of limitation (self reported) on
characteristics of disability (instrumental activities of daily living) and standardizing the predicted
values of the latent variable. This method alleviates self report bias that is intrinsic to variables
such as self assessed health (Bonsang, 2009). Thus, it works as a sanity test.
The sample has 99,613 observations. The summary statistics for the main variables of the study
are displayed in Table 3.1. They compare individual statistics and partner statistics for both control
and treatment group.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Caregivers Non-Caregivers Min Max
Self assessed health 2.49 2.94 1 (very bad) 5 (very good)
Depression scale 8.87 9.85 0 (very depressed) 12 (not depressed)
Disability index 0.75 0.83 0.07 (very limited) 0.98 (not limited)
Years of schooling 10.35 10.97 0 25
Age 69.99 66.20 24 99
Gender (male) 46.03% 50.20% 0% 100%
Partner caregiver 100% 0% 0% 100%
Employed 10.65% 23.41% 0% 100%
Retired 71.73% 61.15% 0% 100%
Homemaker 11.05% 9.50% 0% 100%
Sick or disabled 3.77% 2.75% 0% 100%
Make ends meet 2.69 2.99 1 (with great difficulty) 4 (easily)
Partner’s characteristics:
Self assessed health 2.00 2.97 1 (very bad) 5 (very good)
Depression scale 8.87 9.85 0 (very depressed) 12 (not depressed)
Disability index 0.75 0.83 0.07 (very limited) 0.98 (not limited)
Years of schooling 10.24 10.97 0 25
Age 70.84 66.16 24 99
Observations 5,221 94,392
The table displays the summary statistics separated in two groups, partners caregivers and non-caregivers.
The first two columns show the average values of each variable, while the two last columns show the maxi-
mum and minimum values, respectively.
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The table shows differences between partner caregivers and non-caregiver. Caregivers have worse
indicators in all variables. They are older, have lower levels of physical and mental health, lower
education, higher likelihood of being sick or disabled and more difficulty in making ends meet.
They are also the ones with sicker partners, as shown in the partner’s characteristics section of the
table.
The difference in some indicators may be explained by selection rather than caregiver status be-
cause the need for personal care is more likely to occur for people of more precarious social and
economic backgrounds. Those are the ones who might have “opted” for lower investments in
health in their lives.
The summary statistics for the entire sample are provided in annex, in Table C.1.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 The baseline model
I use the following basic specification:
Healthijt = β.Careijt + γ.Xijt + θ.Countryj + ηWavet + εijt (3.1)
The outcome variable, Healthijt, is one of three: a measure of self reported physical health, a
measure of disability or a measure of mental health, for individual i of country j in wave t. The
physical outcome, given by the self assessed health, is an ordinal variable with discrete values
ranging from 1 to 5, where the highest number corresponds to a very good physical health. The
disability measure is an index, between 0 and 1, with 1 corresponding to a perfect state with no
disabilities. The depression scale is an ordered variable whose discrete values go from 1 to 12,
with 12 corresponding to a perfect mental healthy state.
The main explanatory variable, Careijt is a binary variable taking value 1 if the individual provides
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personal care to the corresponding partner and 0 otherwise.
Vector Xijt includes individual characteristic such as gender, age, education, ability to make ends
meet and employment status. It also includes binary variables stating whether any other type of
care is provided in the household of the potential caregiver4. Depending on the specification, it
may also include partner characteristics, such as self assessed health, disability index, depression
scale, education and age. Finally, the model accounts for Countryj and Wavet fixed effects.
Since both self assessed health and depression scale are ordinal, I perform ordered probit estima-
tions which I complement with the simpler ordinary least squares estimations. For the disability
index, I compute a generalized least squares with a probit link.
In this paper, I compare two alternative specifications of the previous model. First, I estimate
the model with only individual and household characteristics. Then, I redo the regressions to
account for the partners’ health condition. The difference between the coefficients of caregiving
for a partner are attributed to household effects on health, more specifically, households’ health
investment decisions. The idea behind this methodology is that the health production function
depends not only on the individual investment in health but rather on a joint decision with the other
household members. Considering investments in health as direct investments in health care and
prevention or adoption of risky behaviors means, that with higher probability, a frailer individual
belongs to a household where the investment in health was chosen to be lower. So, the health
of the individual should be affected by the health of the partner, since they took health decisions
together. Additionally, sickness and frailty of the patient can have direct effects on the health of
close relatives through the family effects. Therefore, the partner of a sick individual may suffer
emotionally and consequently report lower health outcomes.
4Includes dummies for providing care to other individual who are not partners and receiving help from other
individuals who are not partners
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3.3.2 Partner caregiving by country
Another important part of my analysis is to discriminate how partner caregivers fare in different
countries. The differences in the approaches to long term care and the cultural traits of each country
have the potential to shape the sample in analysis. For example, if there are countries where long
term care absorbs the most severe cases, only the lower intensity cases will be left for partners to
treat. Or alternatively, if a country provides more support for partner caregivers, it may attenuate
the negative effects and foster the positive effects. That type of selection is not discriminated in the
overall results, which present an average effect. But I am questioning whether coefficients across
countries are the same, and if so, which ones drive the results. To that end, I repeat the analysis in
Section 3.3.1, but separating the personal caregiving effect for each country.
3.3.3 Propensity score matching
Given that the sample is unbalanced, with big differences between treatment and control group
I apply a matching estimator to guarantee a more comparable control group. Implementing a
one to one propensity score matching estimator allows me to compare treated with non-treated
individuals, that are similar on a set of observed characteristics.
The matching is done conditioning on the following set of covariates: partner’s self assessed health,
partner’s depression scale, partner’s disability index, partner’s education and partner’s age. For the
individual characteristics, I match on individual age, gender, education, employment, household
size, ability to make ends meet, country and wave.
The propensity score matching estimator allows for a direct comparison between treatment and
control group of similar observed characteristics in a balanced fashion, alleviating the selection
problems of the sample. In this case, matching answers two questions: 1) What would be the
health outcomes of non-caregivers if their partners were as sick as the partners of the caregivers?
2) What is the difference in health outcomes between non-caregivers and partner caregivers if their
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partners have similar health conditions?
Note that matching does not solve the potential problem of reverse causality. Individuals in the
matched group have partners with similar health conditions, thus, they could be providing them
personal care. If the factor explaining that decision is not altruism, then it is possible that they
selected themselves into not providing personal care because they don’t feel they are physically
or mentally able to perform those tasks. Therefore, their health outcomes would be lower due to
selection.
3.3.4 Event Study
Performing an event study on the health effects of becoming a partner caregiver eliminates the
risk of finding results tainted by reverse causality, if transition into caregiving is random. I com-
pare the variation in health of individuals who transition into spousal caregiving with individuals
who remain non-caregivers. Still, it is likely that those two groups do not have the same rates of
health depreciation, due to their differences in characteristics. To account for that, I match them
on observables before treatment, i.e., when individual on both groups are still non-caregivers. If
both groups are non-caregivers, have the same health, education, income, age, gender and equally
healthy/sick partners, in the first wave they are observed, then transitions into caregiving are likely
to occur due to deterioration of their partners’ health. The transition into caregiving is there-
fore more likely to be random, instead of a product of group selection (Schmitz and Westphal,
2015).
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3.4 Results Static approach
3.4.1 Physical health
In Table 3.2, I show the results for self assessed health. In the first two columns, without the
inclusion of partners’ variables, the coefficients of both the OLS and the OProbit are negative
and significant, indicating that partner caregivers have a lower health status than non-caregivers.
However, in the third and fourth column, when partners’ variables are added to the model, the
coefficient’s direction switches. Being statistically significant, it says that when caregivers and non-
caregivers have similar spouses or partners, the caregivers show better self reported physical health.
This implies that household selection components are present in the model, and the inclusion of
partner characteristics helps mitigating that type of selection5.
The average marginal effects for the ordered probit model concerning self reported health are
shown in Figure 3.1. When no partner variables are taken into account (OProbit 1) the individual
who provides personal care to a partner is 1 percentage point more likely to be in outcome 1, and
1.5 percentage points more likely to be in outcome 2, while roughly 1.5 percentage points less
likely to be in outcomes 4 or 5. When the partner’s variables are used in the estimation procedure
(OProbit 2), the figure rotates slightly before outcome 3. Now, the carer is 1 and 1.5 percentage
points less likely to be in outcomes 1 and 2, respectively. Outcome 4 and 5 are now about 1
percentage points more likely.
5But it may create another type of selection driven by reverse causality. This issue is only addressed in the event
study section.
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Table 3.2: Main estimates on Self Assessed Health
Dependent variable: Self Assessed Health
OLS OProbit OLS OProbit
w/o partners’ characteristics w/ partners’ characteristics
Partner caregiver -0.075*** -0.084*** 0.075*** 0.102***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018)
Partner’s self assessed health 0.171*** 0.201***
(0.006) (0.007)
Partner’s depression scale 0.019*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.002)
Partner’s disability index -0.015 0.012
(0.031) (0.039)
Partner’s age 0.026*** 0.033***
(0.005) (0.007)
Gender 0.045*** 0.051*** 0.062*** 0.075***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Age 0.010* 0.015* -0.008 -0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Make ends meet 0.161*** 0.192*** 0.120*** 0.146***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Employed or Self-Employed 0.192*** 0.219*** 0.192*** 0.224***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Unemployed -0.088*** -0.099*** -0.069** -0.078**
(0.024) (0.028) (0.023) (0.027)
Permanently sick or disabled -0.808*** -1.034*** -0.769*** -1.008***
(0.020) (0.028) (0.020) (0.028)
Homemaker -0.002 -0.005 -0.021 -0.028
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016)
Other Status 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.017
(0.032) (0.038) (0.031) (0.037)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Regressions use a total of 99,613 individual surveys collected in waves 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of
SHARE (2004, 2007, 2011, 2013 and 2015), in a total of 20 countries. Standard Errors are
clustered at the household level and shown in parenthesis. All models include fixed effects at
the country and wave level. “Retired” is the base for the employment factor variables. Other
type of care (provided or received), age squared and degree of education of individuals and
partners are also included as control variables, but not displayed in the table.
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Figure 3.1: Partners in Care: Average Marginal Effects on SAH
The figure shows the average marginal effects of providing care to a partner in need on the self
assessed health of the carer. The partial model takes no partner variables into account. In this
model individuals who provide personal care to a partner are more likely to report lower physical
health outcomes and less likely to report higher physical health outcomes. The full model has
partners’ variables into account. In this model individuals who provide personal care to a partner




In Table 3.3, I show the results for depression. Columns 1 and 2 show the OLS and OProbit coeffi-
cients for providing care to a partner when no partner characteristics are introduced. The values are
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that partner caregivers have worse mental health.
Again, when partners’ characteristics are introduced, columns 3 and 4, the coefficients change. In
this case, they lose in magnitude and become positive, but are not statistically significant. Thus,
we cannot reject the hypothesis that partner caregivers and non-caregivers have similar depression
levels.
The average marginal effects of caregiving when depression is the outcome are illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.2. In this figure, when ignoring the partner variables, all the outcomes bellow ten are more
likely to occur if the individual is a partner caregiver, with the highest average marginal effects
being around 1.5 percentage points for outcome 8. The partner caregiver is less likely to be in the
two better outcomes, with 12 having a decrease in probability of almost 6 percentage points. When
including partner variables, the figure is very close to a straight line, with only a small increase in
probability for the two last outcomes.
Regarding the other coefficients, both Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 display similar results in terms
of direction. The partners’ health coefficients for physical self reported health, depression scale
and disability index are all positive, demonstrating that there is a significant positive correlation
between partners’ health outcomes. Concerning the other variables, it is noteworthy that men are
healthier than women and that ability to make ends meet is associated with better health6 (in both
outcomes). Employment status possibilities also present the expected signs. Only age presents a
variation across tables since it is positively associated with depression scale, while it is negatively
associated with physical health.
6In line with the health production models
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Table 3.3: Main estimates on Depression Scale
Dependent variable: Depression Scale
OLS OProbit OLS OProbit
w/o partners’ characteristics w/ partners’ characteristics
Partner caregiver -0.369*** -0.188*** 0.012 0.011
(0.034) (0.016) (0.035) (0.017)
Partner’s self assessed health 0.015 0.013**
(0.008) (0.005)
Partner’s depression scale 0.265*** 0.144***
(0.005) (0.003)
Partner’s disability index 0.066 0.010
(0.072) (0.037)
Partner’s age 0.019 0.004
(0.012) (0.006)
Gender 0.715*** 0.390*** 0.932*** 0.526***
(0.014) (0.008) (0.020) (0.011)
Age 0.118*** 0.061*** 0.083*** 0.048***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006)
Education degree 0.035*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.002)
Make ends meet 0.343*** 0.173*** 0.233*** 0.120***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
Employed or Self-Employed 0.079*** 0.049*** 0.102*** 0.061***
(0.023) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013)
Unemployed -0.359*** -0.195*** -0.323*** -0.186***
(0.054) (0.026) (0.051) (0.026)
Permanently sick or disabled -1.174*** -0.561*** -1.081*** -0.536***
(0.053) (0.024) (0.050) (0.023)
Homemaker -0.124*** -0.051*** -0.155*** -0.071***
(0.031) (0.015) (0.030) (0.016)
Other Status -0.199** -0.103** -0.171** -0.095**
(0.069) (0.035) (0.064) (0.034)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Regressions use a total of 99,613 individual surveys collected in waves 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of
SHARE (2004, 2007, 2011, 2013 and 2015), in a total of 20 countries. Standard Errors are
clustered at the household level and shown in parenthesis. All models include fixed effects at
the country and wave level. “Retired” is the base for the employment factor variables. Other
type of care (provided or received), age squared and degree of education of individuals and
partners are also included as control variables, but not displayed in the table.
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Figure 3.2: Partners in Care: Average Marginal Effects on Depression
The figure shows the average marginal effects of providing care to a partner in need on the de-
pression scale of the carer. The partial model takes no partner variables into account. In this
model individuals who provide personal care to a partner are more likely to report lower depres-
sion outcomes and less likely to report highest depression outcomes. The full model accounts for
partners’ variables. In this model individuals who provide personal care to a partner are as likely
to report lower depression outcomes as individuals who do not provide care, but slightly more
likely to report the highest values of the depression scale.
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3.4.3 Disability
When using self reported measures, the bias inherent to the answers can be a major problem in
econometric analysis. Factors such as education, income and others may drive different groups
to answer in different ways (Bago d’Uva, O’Donnell and Van Doorslaer, 2008). I may find that
problem when using physical self-reported health.7 One way to attenuate the bias for such variables
is to use a list of predictors to estimate its latent variable and standardize the predicted values
to create an index. One alternative commonly used to substitute the self assessed health is the
disability index. I built the disability index using a categorical question on how much the individual
feels limited in activities because of her health. I regressed limitation on a group of binary variables
about activities of daily living and health problems using a probit model. With the estimated
coefficients I determine the maximum and the minimum predicted value for disability, necessary
to standardize the individual predicted values. This disability index is therefore an “anchored”
measure, less prone to bias and measurement error.
Table 3.4 shows the ordinary least square and the generalized linear model (with a probit link)
estimations for disability. The numbers in the GLM columns correspond to the average marginal
effects. This table tells the same tale as Table 3.2. When no partner caracteristics are included
in the model, caregiving has a negative sign. However, it turns positive when partner’s health,
education and age are taken into account. In the fourth column, the average marginal effects tell
that an individual who is a partner caregiver has, on average, two extra percentage points in the
disability index. Therefore, partner caregivers feel slightly less limited in activities.
Note that there is a strong positive correlation between the level of disability of the individual and
the one of the correspondent partner. Again, it supports the theory that health investment decisions
are made at the household level.
7The same may be true for reports of depression levels, but on a lower scale since the Euro-D is calculated using
the answers to twelve objective questions.
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Table 3.4: Main estimates on Disability Index
Dependent variable: Disability Index
OLS GLM OLS GLM
w/o partners’ characteristics w/ partners’ characteristics
Partner caregiver -0.011*** -0.008*** 0.019*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Partner’s self assessed health 0.000 0.001*
(0.000) (0.001)
Partner’s depression scale 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Partner’s disability index 0.152*** 0.124***
(0.006) (0.006)
Partner’s age 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Gender 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Make ends meet 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Employed or Self-Employed 0.010*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployed -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Permanently sick or disabled -0.117*** -0.109*** -0.113*** -0.105***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Homemaker -0.003 -0.002 -0.005** -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Other Status -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table displays the average marginal effects. Regressions use a total of 99,613 individual
surveys collected in waves 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of SHARE (2004, 2007, 2011, 2013 and 2015),
in a total of 20 countries. Standard Errors are clustered at the household level and shown
in parenthesis. All models include fixed effects at the country and wave level. “Retired”
is the base for the employment factor variables. Other type of care (provided or received),
age squared and degree of education of individuals and partners are also included as control
variables, but not displayed in the table.
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3.4.4 Partner caregiving effect by country
The results discriminated by country are presented in Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5. The
figures show the interaction of providing personal care to a partner and country, following the
methodology of Equation (3.1).
Figure 3.3: SAH of partner caregivers
The graph shows the coefficients of the variable “Partner caregiver” discriminated by
country, in the self assessed health regression. The model includes both individuals
and partner characteristics.
Figure 3.3 shows the discriminated results for self assessed health. Providing personal care to
a partner in need is mostly positive across countries, however, only statistically significant for
Belgium and Estonia. Only Slovenia, Hungary, Ireland and Israel present negative point estimates.
Only Israel shows significance. Note that heterogeneity is weak across the board. If Belgium and
Slovenia are left out, no country is statistically distinguishable from any other.
Figure 3.4 displays the coefficients of partner caregiving on the depression of the carers by country.
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Figure 3.4: Depression of partner caregivers
The graph shows the coefficients of the variable “Partner caregiver” discriminated by
country, in the depression regression. The model includes both individuals and partner
characteristics.
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Again, most countries show positive point estimates (15), but only one with statistical significance.
The remaining five countries have negative point estimates, with Spain, Italy and Israel presenting
coefficients statistically distinguishable from zero. Similar to the SAH analysis, heterogeneity is
also weak for depression. Besides Spain, Italy and Israel, countries are not statistically distinguish-
able between each other.
Figure 3.5: Disability of partner caregivers
The graph shows the coefficients of the variable “Partner caregiver” discriminated by
country, in the disability regression. The model includes both individuals and partner
characteristics.
Figure 3.5 displays the country coefficients of spousal caregiving for the disability outcome. Only
three countries (Ireland, Luxembourg and Israel) present negative point estimates, with no statis-
tically significance. All the remaining countries, have positive point estimates for partner care.
From those, eleven present statistical significance.
This section shows that when accounting for partner characteristics, partner caregiver present bet-
ter levels of physical health (mainly though their levels of disability) in most of the countries in
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analysis. It also shows that results from depression are more mixed. In the latter, caregivers from
Spain, Italy and Israel present clear losses when compared to non-caregivers. There appear to be no
major patterns in terms of regions. There is no heterogeneity between countries since no country
can be statistically distinguishable from any other.
3.4.5 Other results - heterogeneity
The literature on informal care has shown differences across gender, namely on the likelihood of
becoming informal caregivers. In this section I want to define whether there is a difference in
health between male and female partner caregivers. Figure C.1, Figure C.2 and Figure C.3 show
the results of the coefficients of being partners caregivers on SAH, depression and disability, dis-
criminated by gender. Regarding the two physical measures, SAH and disability index, both male
and female caregivers are more likely to have better outcomes. However, there is no heterogeneity
since they are not statistically distinguishable. The depression coefficients present a positive point
estimate for men and negative for women, but again, not statistically distinguishable from each
other.
Results may not be linear in health. The difference between partner caregivers and non-caregivers
may depend on the starting level of health. Therefore, I also look at the coefficients of being a
partner caregiver on health for three different levels of disability. I divide the analysis into three
groups: individuals with disability index higher than 90%; in between 80% and 90%; and below
80%. The results for SAH, depression and disability are presented in Figure C.4, Figure C.5 and
Figure C.6, respectively. The results for the two physical health measures show higher partner
caregiver coefficients for the more physically able individuals. This indicates that the difference
between caregivers and non-caregivers is higher for those with better physical capabilities. Note,
that in Figure C.6, the two better physical health groups are statistically distinguishable from the
worst group, showing some heterogeneity. In terms of depression, in neither groups do caregivers
present differences from non-caregivers. There is also no heterogeneity between groups.
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3.4.6 Matching
3.4.6.1 Determinants of partner care
The results of the Probit model implicit to the propensity score matching are shown in Table 3.5.
As expected, the probability of providing care to a partner depends negatively on all three health
outcomes of the partner. No one is going to offer (demand) personal care if personal care is
not needed. Thus, lower health outcomes of the potential patient are a necessary condition for
caregiving to happen. The age of the individual negatively affects the probability of providing
personal care while the age of the partner naturally increases it. Additionally, women are more
likely to be partner caregivers, and higher capacity to make ends meet is associated with higher
probability of caregiving. Employment status says that employed individuals are less likely to
provide care to a partner when compared to retired individuals.
I choose the variables in a way to minimize unobserved heterogeneity. The combination of the
individual’s variables with the partner variables allows me to compare two groups that face the
same hardships of frailty and disease of the partner.
Health outcomes of the potential carer cannot be used in the matching process, as they are the
variables of interest that are going to be compared across groups. But since health of the potential
carer may also be a predictor of informal caregiving there might be room for reverse causality. I
address that issue in the event study section.
In Table C.2, in annex, I display the means for the treated and matched group obtained through
the propensity score matching. Note that this is a one to one matching with a caliper of 0.2 of the
standard deviation. The values in the table are very close for all variables, guaranteeing that the
two groups are comparable. For instance, the partner disability index is, on average, 83% for the
treated, against 83.2% for the matched, which implies that patients and potential patients have sim-
ilar capacities for performing daily activities. Alternatively, there may be reverse causality coming
from an unobserved “caring ability”? Maybe caregivers selected themselves into caregiving be-
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Table 3.5: Propensity Score Matching - De-
terminants of caregiving
Dependent variable: Partner Caregiver
Probit
Partner’s self assessed health -0.131***
(0.011)
Partner’s depression scale -0.017***
(0.004)








Make ends meet 0.003
(0.009)










* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table displays the Probit model implicit
to the computation of the propensity scores.
It uses a total of 99,613 observations. It in-
cludes fixed effects at the country and wave
level. “Retired” is the base for the employ-
ment factor variables.
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cause they have a natural aptitude for giving care, or because they have better relations with their
partners? If such an unobserved characteristic is related with health then it would cause biased
estimates.
3.4.6.2 Average treatment effect on the treated
In Table 3.6, I show the averages of the treated, matched control and unmatched control group. The
“unmached row”, displays the difference in health outcomes before matching. Both depression,
self assessed health and disability are reported at lower values for partner caregivers. This is similar
to the results found in the “no partners’ variables” regressions. When the groups are comparable
however, the treated have slightly better health outcomes than the matched control group. This is an
important result because it states that the caregivers are not worse than non-caregivers, when their
partners condition is of similar severity. Nevertheless, it seems that what causes worse outcomes
is very likely to be their household decisions of health investment and consequent correlation of
health. This correlation may be due to risky habits and other behavioral components. Also, the
emotional burden of having a sick or frail partner may impact the health of the individual.
One concern when interpreting these results is the potential existence of reverse causality. Indeed,
one reason that might explain the difference in caregiver status between individuals with similar
observed characteristics may be that their health condition does not allow them to be caregivers.
In that case, the regression and matching results would be capturing this effect. Then, caregivers
would not be healthier because they are caregivers, but instead, they would be caregivers because
they are healthier (in relation to the matched control group).
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Table 3.6: Matching Estimates: Effects of Providing Care to a Partner
Self Assessed Health Treated Control Difference Standard Error
Unmached 2.489 2.947 -0.457 0.015
Matched 2.504 2.433 0.072 0.021
Depression Scale Treated Control Difference Standard Error
Unmatched 8.874 9.864 -0.989 0.030
Matched 8.922 8.842 0.080 0.050
Disability Index Treated Control Difference Standard Error
Unmatched 0.752 0.830 -0.077 0.002
Matched 0.756 0.723 0.033 0.003
The matching uses a sample of 97,89 individuals, comparing a treatment
group of 5,082 persons with a control group of 92,811 persons. The re-
sults illustrate a 1 to 1 propensity score matching with no replacement and
a caliper of 0.2 of the standard error, in the selection equation. The analy-
sis is performed on the common support.
3.5 Event study - Changes in caregiving status
3.5.1 The model
So far I looked at a static problem, to conclude that, at a given point in time, caregivers have better
reported health measures, when the analysis is conditioned on partners’ health characteristics. In
this section, I address the changes in caregiver status across waves. I perform an event study with all
waves in analysis to capture transitions of non-caregivers into caregivers. The subsample includes
two groups: non-caregivers who become caregivers in the subsequent wave and non-caregivers
who remain non-caregivers. I apply the same line of thought I used throughout this paper to a
dynamic framework. I include the partners’ characteristics in a differences in differences model
which is written in the following way:
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Healthijt = β0 + β1Period2t + β2(NC→ C)i + β3[Period2t ∗ (NC→ C)i]
+ γ.Xi + θ.Countryj + εijt
(3.2)
Healthijt is one of the three health outcomes used in this paper. Period2t is a binary variable
taking value 1 if the observation belongs to the second wave in which the individual is observed
(i.e for an individual who transitions into caregiving it corresponds to the period where she is a
caregiver). The variable (NC → C)i is a binary variable which takes value 1 if the individual
transitions into caregiving.
Xi is a vector which includes individual and partner characteristics and Countryj stands for country
fixed effects. εijt is the error term.
Note, however, that studying transitions into spousal caregiving is not enough to guarantee causal-
ity. Individuals of the two groups may have different health depreciation rates, independently of
the change in caregiver status. For example, caregivers may be part of households with lower
health investments (e.g. behavioral risks), and thus, present higher depreciation of health. Alterna-
tively, if reverse causality exists, after controlling for partner characteristics, then non-caregivers
are likely to be the ones with lower depreciation rates. To account for this, I perform a propen-
sity score matching between the groups in the first period they are observed (i.e, individuals of
both groups are still non-caregivers). The regression is then performed on the common support re-
stricted sample. This regression adjusted matching approach is inspired by Schmitz and Westphal
2015. By forcing individuals to be “equal” in the pre-treatment period, I reduce the probability that
health variations are driven by different depreciation rates across groups. Now, reverse causality
is unlikely since the health of both non-caregivers and caregivers is identical pre-treatment. In this
framework, transitions into spousal caregiving are more likely to be random.
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3.5.2 Results
Table 3.7 shows the results for Equation (3.2).
The interaction between individuals who transition into spousal caregiving, NC → C, and the
period of treatment shows positive values for the physical measures. However, only the coefficient
of self reported health is statistically significant. The results imply that transition into caregiving
generates a slight improvement on how individuals rate their physical health. However, there seems
to be no effect on actual physical capacities since the disability index shows no improvements. The
depression coefficient is negative but not statistically significant.
The results are not enough to assess the long term effects, and should therefore be interpreted only
as short run effects of providing care to a partner.
Table 3.7: Longitudinal Analysis - Three Differences Model
Self Assessed Health Depression Disability Index
(OProbit) (OProbit) (GLM)
main
Treatment period -0.005 0.041 0.021
(0.033) (0.032) (0.014)
NC→ C 0.034 0.037 0.047**
(0.035) (0.034) (0.015)
NC→ C in treatment period 0.078* -0.015 0.015
(0.039) (0.039) (0.018)
Regressions use a total of 7.704 individual surveys (from which 3,852 belong to the
groups NC → C) collected in waves 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of SHARE (2004, 2007, 2011,
2013 and 2015), in a total of 17 countries. Standard Errors are clustered at the house-
hold level and shown in parenthesis. All models include fixed effects at the country and
wave level. All individual and partner characteristics defined in Section 3.3.1 are used
in the regressions but are omitted in the table.
To provide a glimpse into long run effects, I provide the same analysis for continued caregiving. I
match continued caregivers on a first wave against “continued” non-caregivers. This approach is
not as robust as the last one since, in this case, the caregiving status is less likely to be random.
There must be a reason why people with similar health and similar partners have different decisions
96
regarding caregiving. If those reasons are in any way related with the outcome variables, then
results are biased. Consequently, conclusions should be taken with caution. Table 3.8 displays the
results.
Table 3.8: Longitudinal Analysis - Three Differences Model
Self Assessed Health Depression Disability Index
(OProbit) (OProbit) (GLM)
Treatment period -0.012 0.012 0.015
(0.074) (0.075) (0.031)
C→ C 0.252*** 0.127 0.094**
(0.076) (0.073) (0.034)
C→ C in treatment period -0.084 -0.020 -0.027
(0.076) (0.077) (0.033)
Regressions use a total of 1.848 individual surveys (from which 924 belong to the
group of continued caregivers, C → C) collected in waves 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of SHARE
(2004, 2007, 2011, 2013 and 2015), in a total of 17 countries8. Standard Errors are
clustered at the household level and shown in parenthesis. All models include fixed ef-
fects at the country and wave level. All individual and partner characteristics defined
in Section 3.3.1 are used in the regressions but are omitted in the table.
Continued spousal caregivers present a negative variation in both measures of physical health and
the measure of mental health. Nonetheless, the results are not statistically significant, indicating it
is not possible to reject the null hypothesis. So, spousal caregivers and non-caregivers who have the
same individual and partner characteristics in a given period, also display similar health outcomes
one period later. The results depend on the belief that these matched caregivers and non-caregivers
have the same health depreciation rates. It also depends on the belief that the estimations provide
enough statistical power.9
Results using different pre-treatment matching calipers are in all identical to the ones presented in
this sections, as shown in Table C.3 and Table C.4.
Summarizing, there are some slight positive short run effects of providing personal care to a partner
in the way providers assess their physical health. Continued care does not appear to cause any
9Continued caregivers are few across observations which hinders the statistical power of these estimations.
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differences in terms of health.
3.5.3 Other results
As in Section 3.4.4, the results of transitioning into partner caregiving may be reported by country.
Those results are shown in Figure C.7, Figure C.8 and Figure C.9. The graphs show no hetero-
geneity in the results by countries, since countries are not statistically distinguishable between each
other.
Similar to Section 3.4.5, this section may be extended to study the heterogeneity of the results with
respect to gender and level of disability.
The results of the previous event study discriminated by gender are displayed in Figure C.10, Fig-
ure C.11 and Figure C.12. There is no evidence of observed heterogeneity in the partner caregiving
effect across gender. Still, it is important to note that women present positive effects of becoming
partner caregivers on the disability index.
The results of the previous event study discriminated by disability are displayed in Figure C.13,
Figure C.14 and Figure C.15. There is no evidence of observed heterogeneity in the partner care-
giving effect across disability intervals. On the disability index, however, the two higher intervals
are the ones reporting gains of transitioning into partner caregiving.
3.6 Conclusion
The increase in life expectancy has a cost. If people live longer, they also live more time with frailer
bodies. Consequently, authorities have increased their concerns about how to provide long term
care to ageing individuals and any strategy should aim at optimizing between formal and informal
care. But to do that, knowledge on the the pros and cons of each type of care is fundamental.
I use a very precise subsample of single living couples to provide a characterization of caregivers
showing that, when compared to individuals with similar characteristics and equally sick partners,
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they present better health outcomes, which implies they constitute a positive selection. The results
don’t show any pattern when discriminated by countries. My approach also reinforces the impor-
tance of having into account correlations between partners’ health which arise from family effects
and shared household health investment decisions. Part of the result is causal, as I show that if
transitions into caregiving are random, becoming a caregiver leads to gains in perceived physical
health. However, there appear to be no gains in terms of mental health or actual physical health
(level of disability). Continued caregiving does not show meaningful results. In SHARE, it is hard
to observe partner caregivers across waves, which implies a small number of observations and,
consequently weaker statistical power.
Positive outcomes for partner caregiving are good news, but they are only self-perceived. In this
study I am looking at partners who provide personal care, which is only an entry level type of
caregiving. The providers are mostly retired and perform simple tasks such as helping with getting
out of bed, bathing or dressing. I do not distinguish between more severe cases or more demanding
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The Portuguese health care system is primarily characterized by a universal National Health Ser-
vice (NHS) that is regulated at the federal level. A comprehensive description of the Portuguese
health care system can be found in Barros, Machado and Simões (2011).
The NHS is designed such that each individual has an assigned gatekeeper (family doctor) that
serves as the point of entry to obtain health care. However, patients often face delays between
visiting the gatekeeper and obtaining access to specialty care. For this reason, it is common for
patients to bypass the intended referral mechanism by going straight to the ED, where they can
obtain all specialty care (including lab tests and exams) in a single day. Because of this, many
visits to the emergency department are, in fact, not true medical emergencies.
Visiting the ED is not free to the patient. There is a small flat access charge that is meant to
prevent excessive use of the ED and is not a sizable source of revenue. There is also a co-payment
for any additional lab test, exam, or treatment procedure the patient receives, which are typically
unknown to patients until the bill is received at the end of the visit. The access charge does not
seem to be successful at preventing inappropriate use of the ED (Barros, Machado and Simões
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2011). This is in line with recent research showing that individuals are not price sensitive with
respect to emergency visits (see Duarte 2012 or Ellis, Martins and Zhu 2017).
Between 2011 and 2012 (our sample period) the billing system changed. In 2011 the access charge
was 9.60N. The OOP was a direct mapping from each specific service to a co-payment for hun-
dreds of types of services (for example, the OOP for an X-Ray was 1.80N and for an Magnetic
Resonance Imaging procedure was 21.50N).
In 2012 the access charge more than doubled, increasing to 20N. For the diagnosis and treatment
procedures, the OOP was defined as a piecewise mapping between the price of the service and
a co-payment (e.g., procedures that cost between 60N and 64.99N have an OOP of 12N). This
means that in 2012 more expensive procedures had a weakly higher co-payment.
A.2 Robustness checks
A.2.1 Exogeneity of Visits to the ED
The institutional context of our setting suggests that since patients bypass the gate-keeping process
and choose to go to the ED instead, arrivals to the ED might not be entirely exogenous, at least for
those with low levels of urgency. The endogeneity of low-urgency visits has been documented by
Sivey (2018), who shows that these patients are more likely to walk out of the ED without being
seen by a doctor. To protect against this we test an alternative IV, in a fashion similar to that in
Sivey (2018). We still use the number of patients that arrived in the previous 60 minutes, but only
those that present levels of urgency ranging from yellow to red. Indeed, by doing this we remove
the two lowest levels of urgency (blue and green)1, whose arrivals to the ED are more likely to be
a choice and bias our estimates.
In addition to including only the three most urgent arrivals as the basis for our instrumental vari-
1Ideally we would like to exclude yellow as well in order to have an even stronger robustness test, but the lack of
variation when considering only orange and red and its incapacity to predict the size of the overall queue erode the
strength of the instrument.
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able, we use them as three separate instruments, rather than their sum. We choose to estimate
this over-identified model in order to conduct over-identification tests on the validity of the instru-
ments.
In Table A.4, column (1), the queue coefficient indicates that one more patient in the waiting room
causes a decrease in length of stay of 2.7%. The value is similar to the one obtained in the standard
specification, attesting to the robustness of the first set of results. In column (2), the coefficient
states that one more person in the queue decreases the probability of being sent for further care or
diagnosis by 0.59 percentage points. In column (3), the intensive margin still shows a negative,
non-statistically significant, coefficient, with one more patient waiting decreasing the OOP by
0.26%. Again, the result is similar to the one in the standard specification. These results suggest
that using all arrivals as the basis for the instrument does not lead to biased estimates.
Finally, Table A.4 shows, in the last two rows, the Hansen J statistic and corresponding p-values
of the over-identification test. The p-value of 0.2 and 0.3 points indicate a low correlation between
the different instruments and the predicted residuals, suggesting that our instruments satisfy the
exclusion restriction.
A.2.2 Instrument Time Interval
The instrumental variable used in this paper was defined as the number of arrivals in the previous
60 minutes to the patient’s arrival to the ED. Theoretically, the exclusion restriction should hold
for other time intervals, as long as the episodes that require emergency care are random, after
controlling for hour-specific fixed effects. The only constraint in selecting the appropriate interval
becomes the relevancy of the instrument in predicting the size of the queue.
We re-estimate Equation (1.1) using different time intervals for the instrument, corresponding to
periods of 15, 30, and 90 minutes and present our results in Table A.5. As we decrease this
time interval, the F-test of the first stage regression increases, as do the point estimates for the
queue variable. However, the estimated coefficients are not statistically different from those in
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the benchmark specification. Even though the 15 and 30 minutes IVs present higher first-stage
F-statistics than the benchmark model, they do not perform consistently better across all of the
model specifications used in this paper. The strength of these alternative IVs falls below 10 when
estimating the model specification of Equation (1.2).
A.2.3 Night and Day
The results shown in Section 1.4.2 are average effects. Even though the model relies on hourly
fixed effects for identification, it does not look for potential heterogeneity within each day. This is
especially important since it is the presence of capacity constraints that forces doctors to change
their behavior. Given that the number of arrivals to the ED is much higher during the day, it is
likely that constraints bind during this time, which identifies our coefficients.
In this section we divide the analysis into two different spells, night and day, in order to understand
whether the results are general across the entire day or if they are being driven by the particularities
of one of those periods. We define night as the period from 10 p.m. to 8 a.m., which is associated
with a lower trend in terms of arrivals to the ED (see Figure 1.4).
The results in Table A.6, in the appendix, show that during day periods the LOS coefficient is
significant and roughly the same as the one from Section 1.4.2. The night coefficient is also nega-
tive, but higher in absolute values and not statistically significant. In the out-of-pocket analysis the
coefficients tell a similar story. The extensive margin is important only during the day, again with
a similar coefficient to the one in Section 1.4.2. The intensive margin is also consistent, during the
day period. However, in the night period it shows greater sensitivity to the queue level, presenting
a higher and statistically significant coefficient.
These results show that the overall estimates are being driven by day-period patients. The number
of patients during the night period is rather small, and so there is not enough variation to identify
the coefficient with precision.
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A.2.4 Age Groups
Age is another potential factor of heterogeneity. In our main specification we included the vari-
able age in a linear framework, promoting the simplicity of the model and believing it would be
effective enough. In this section we want to provide more depth to the analysis of the age vari-
able by dividing it into five-years age groups. We therefore run Equation (1.1) with age replaced
by the abovementioned age groups. The age groups’ coefficients are displayed in Figure A.4, in
annex.
Panel A of Figure A.4 shows that LOS increases with the age of the patient in what seems to
be a trend close to linear, thus corroborating our first and simpler approach. Panel B shows a
similar pattern regarding out-of-pocket payments. Therefore, we can say that both time and use of
resources increase with age of the patient.
The queue coefficient, not shown in the figures, is robust to this change, for each of the outcomes,
showing the same values as in the main approach.
Table A.1: Statistics of Arrivals within a day
Hour Max Hour Min Max/Min Day/Night
Blue 10h 5h 21.06 5.52
Green 10h 5h 11.72 3.83
Yellow 15h 6h 5.88 2.52
Orange 11h 6h 4.23 2.05
Red 19h 7h 6.57 1.58
The two first columns show the hour of the day at which the
maximum and minimum amount of arrivals occur, on aver-
age. The two last columns show the ratio between the max-
imum number of arrivals and the minimum number of ar-
rivals, and the ratio between the number of arrivals during
daytime and the number of arrivals during nighttime.
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Table A.2: Robustness to different levels of fixed effects
Benchmark No FE Y/M/D Y/M/H Y+M+D+H
Queue/10 -0.286*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.010 -0.011
(0.061) (0.023) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011)
Blue -1.297*** -1.274*** -1.229*** -1.218*** -1.217***
(0.032) (0.039) (0.030) (0.030) (0.042)
Green -0.886*** -0.877*** -0.858*** -0.852*** -0.852***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017)
Orange 0.652*** 0.663*** 0.654*** 0.657*** 0.656***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Red -0.368*** -0.378*** -0.377*** -0.381*** -0.378***
(0.084) (0.090) (0.054) (0.054) (0.089)
Female 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.071***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
Age 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results for the effects of queues on the log of length of stay.
Results use a total of 276,061 arrivals in the emergency department of a Lisbon
hospital, from Jan 2011-Oct 2012. Standard errors are cluster-robust at the hour
level and shown in parentheses. The benchmark triage color is yellow. Column 1
includes fixed effects at the Year-Month-Day-Hour level (15,801 levels). Column
2 has no fixed effect. Column 3 includes fixed effects at the Year-Month-Day level
(670 levels). Column 4 includes fixed effects at the Year-Month-Hours level (528
levels). Column 5 includes year, month, day and hour fixed effects, but no interac-
tions. First stage SW F-stats: 30.89 (column 1); 30.13 (column 2); 961.72 (column
3); 1185.70 (column 4); 268.14 (column 5).
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Table A.3: Regressions by Urgency Level
Dependent variable: Log(LOS) 1 if OOP > access charge
Blu&Gre Yellow Oran&Red Blu&Gre Yellow Oran&Red
Blue and Green Queue/10 -0.278** -0.125***
(0.109) (0.034)
Yellow Queue/10 -2.139** -0.461**
(0.935) (0.196)
Orange and Red Queue/10 -13.659 -2.375
(16.752) (3.983)
Female 0.112*** -0.014 -0.071 0.012 -0.059*** 0.022
(0.020) (0.017) (0.092) (0.009) (0.009) (0.038)
Age 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the effects of queues of some urgency level on the length of stay (first three columns) and
out-of-pocket payment (last three columns) of patients belonging to that same urgency level. The data used
in the regressions consider the arrivals in the emergency department of a Lisbon hospital, from Jan 2011-
Oct 2012. It divides into 154,000 blue and green arrivals, 101,829 yellow arrivals, and 12,971 orange and
red arrivals. Standard errors are cluster-robust at the hour level and shown in parentheses. All models in-
clude fixed effects at the Year-Month-Day-Hour level. First stage SW F-stats: 18.50 (columns 1 and 4);
19.16 (columns 2 and 5); 3.88 (columns 3 and 6).
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Table A.4: Alternative Instrumental Variable
Dependent variable: Log(LOS) 1 if OOP > Log(OOP|OOP >
access charge access charge)
Queue/10 -0.277*** -0.059** -0.026
(0.087) (0.029) (0.032)
Blue -1.296*** -0.474*** -0.189***
(0.034) (0.009) (0.012)
Green -0.886*** -0.238*** -0.160***
(0.012) (0.004) (0.004)
Orange 0.652*** 0.179*** 0.168***
(0.012) (0.003) (0.005)
Red -0.368*** -0.046*** 0.466***
(0.084) (0.015) (0.025)
Female 0.066*** -0.009 -0.027***
(0.017) (0.006) (0.006)
Age 0.015*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age -0.001** 0.001*** -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
First-stage Instrument F-Stat 10.376 10.376 13.628
Hansen J-Statistic 3.072 0.204 0.421
Chi-sq(2) p-value 0.215 0.903 0.810
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the IV results for the effects of queue size on length of stay and out-
of-pocket payments. This model uses previous arrivals of triage color red, orange, and
yellow as the three IVs for queue. In LOS and OOP extensive margin regressions, re-
sults use a total of 276,061 arrivals in the emergency department of a Lisbon hospital,
from Jan 2011-Oct 2012. In OOP intensive margin regressions, results use a total of
73,609 arrivals, from Jan 2012-Oct 2012. Standard errors are cluster-robust at the hour
level and shown in parentheses. All models include fixed effects at the Year-Month-
Day-Hour level. The benchmark triage color is yellow.
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Table A.5: Results with different IV time intervals
Dependent variable: Log(LOS)
IV: Number of arrivals in the previous... 15 Minutes 30 Minutes 60 minutes 90 minutes
(benchmark)
Queue/10 -0.341*** -0.297*** -0.286*** -0.259***
(0.086) (0.054) (0.061) (0.061)
Blue -1.306*** -1.299*** -1.297*** -1.293***
(0.036) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Green -0.890*** -0.887*** -0.886*** -0.885***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Orange 0.651*** 0.652*** 0.652*** 0.653***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Red -0.368*** -0.368*** -0.368*** -0.368***
(0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.085)
Female 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.067***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Age 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
First-stage Instrument F-Stat 34.6 34.13 30.89 22.78
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the IV results for the effects of queue size on the treatment time for different IV
specifications. Columns 1 to 4 display the coefficients when using as IV the number of persons ar-
riving in the 15, 30, 60, and 90 minutes prior to the patient being called by a doctor. Results use
a total of 276,061 arrivals in the emergency department of a Lisbon hospital, from Jan 2011-Oct
2012. Standard errors are cluster-robust at the hour level and shown in parentheses. All models in-
clude fixed effects at the Year-Month-Day-Hour level (15,801 levels). The benchmark triage color
is yellow.
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Table A.6: Day and Night regressions
Dependent variable: Log(LOS) 1 if OOP > Log(OOP|OOP >
access charge access charge
Day Night Day Night Day Night
Queue/10 -0.269*** -0.527 -0.088*** 0.052 -0.013 -0.400**
(0.055) (0.381) (0.016) (0.111) (0.018) (0.174)
Blue -1.333*** -1.066*** -0.485*** -0.411*** -0.182*** -0.308***
(0.023) (0.232) (0.010) (0.044) (0.012) (0.030)
Green -0.897*** -0.860*** -0.243*** -0.205*** -0.160*** -0.200***
(0.014) (0.061) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.023)
Orange 0.647*** 0.691*** 0.174*** 0.179*** 0.170*** 0.207***
(0.012) (0.058) (0.004) (0.014) (0.005) (0.040)
Red -0.274*** -0.595*** -0.046** -0.053** 0.448*** 0.550***
(0.095) (0.134) (0.018) (0.027) (0.028) (0.049)
Female 0.059*** 0.051 -0.007 -0.020* -0.026*** -0.039***
(0.019) (0.038) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.014)
Age 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female*Age -0.001** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
First-stage Instrument F-Stat 26.17 35.93 26.17 35.93 28.65 9.24
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the IV results for the effects of queues on length of stay and out-of-pocket payments across
night and day periods. For the LOS and OOP extensive margin regressions, results use a total of 276,061
arrivals in the emergency department of a Lisbon hospital, from Jan 2011-Oct 2012. For the OOP inten-
sive margin regressions, results use a total of 73,609 arrivals, from Jan 2012-Oct 2012. Standard errors
are cluster-robust at the hour level and shown in parentheses. All models include fixed effects at the Year-
Month-Day-Hour level. The benchmark triage color is yellow.
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Note: Length of stay, for each visit, is defined as the time (in minutes)
between a patient being called to see a doctor for the first time and the time
at which she is discharged by the doctor.
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Note: Each panel subsets our sample according to the color that each visit was
attributed at the triage. The color-specific queue is the number of people waiting
that have the same triage color as the visit. For example, the “blue” panel uses
all visits that had a “blue” triage level and the histogram shows the number of
people waiting with a “blue” visit as well.
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Note: Each figure represents the coefficients of the level of triage interacted with the
queue in a regression model that includes Year-Month-Day-Hour fixed effects and uses
the number of visits in the previous 60 minutes as the instrument for the queue. The
second figure of Panel B includes data from 2012 only. Dashed lines at 95% confidence
intervals.
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Note: Each figure represents the coefficients of the age group of the patient (15 to 20
is the benchmark group) in a regression model that includes Year-Month-Day-Hour
fixed effects and uses the number of visits in the previous 60 minutes as an instrument




Table B.1: Main Estimates on the Probability of Readmission
Dependent variable: Readmission
Standard Conservative Standard Conservative
Occupancy Two Days Before Discharge 0.035*** 0.022***
(0.009) (0.005)
Turnover Rate t-2 -0.016*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.002)
Occupancy Rate Variation t-2 0.076*** 0.033***
(0.008) (0.007)
Male 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Procedures 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.056 0.036 0.056 0.036
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results of the effects of occupancy rates two days before discharge on the
probability of a readmission episode. Results use a total of 1,687,348 discharges in 41 Portuguese
Public Hospitals, from 2014 to 2016. Standard errors are clustered at the week level and shown in
parenthesis. All models include fixed effects at the Year-Month-Week-Hospital level (9,286 lev-
els), age groups fixed effects (11) and DRG-Severity fixed effects (595).
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Table B.2: Main Estimates on the Probability of Readmission
Dependent variable: Readmission
Standard Conservative Standard Conservative
Occupancy Three Days Before Discharge -0.006 -0.000
(0.007) (0.005)
Turnover Rate t-3 -0.005 -0.003
(0.003) (0.001)
Occupancy Rate Variation t-3 0.022** 0.018***
(0.007) (0.004)
Male 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Procedures 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.056 0.036 0.056 0.036
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the results of the effects of occupancy rates three days before discharge on the
probability of a readmission episode. Results use a total of 1,687,348 discharges in 41 Portuguese
Public Hospitals, from 2014 to 2016. Standard errors are clustered at the week level and shown in
parenthesis. All models include fixed effects at the Year-Month-Week-Hospital level (9,286 levels),
age groups fixed effects (11) and DRG-Severity fixed effects (595).
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B.1 Interaction of variation and high occupancy
In Section 2.5.3 I answered a question about the non-linearity of the occupancy coefficient, but
the same concern applies to occupancy variation. In the same line of thought, occupancy variation
should only impact health outcomes if the hospital is already crowded. Again, having an increase
of 10 percentage points in occupancy when the hospital is at 50% capacity should have little to no
importance. But experiencing such increase in occupancy for a hospital which is already at 100%
would likely cause problems. Theoretically it would be expected that a decision to discharge would
be more sensible to variations when hospitals are crowded. To test this hypothesis, I use different
intervals of occupancy and run individual regressions for each of those intervals. The results for
the coefficients on occupancy variation one day before discharge are showed in Figure B.1. The
corresponding conservative approach graph is displayed in Figure B.2.













Note: This figure shows the effects of occupancy variation one day before
patient’s discharge on the likelihood of readmission by level of occupancy,
using the standard approach.
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Positive variation in occupancy rates one day before patient’s discharge does not have any sig-
nificant effect on the probability of readmission if occupancy is lower than 85%. From then on,
positive variation in occupancy rates is associated with higher probability of readmission. For high
enough values of occupancy, the probability increases by an average of 0.01 percentage points if
occupancy variation increases by 10 percentage points. Physicians manage the hospital resources
(including their own time), and when observing an increase in occupancy on an already-crowded
hospital they may decide to force some discharges to accommodate for new patients.











Note: This figure shows the effects of occupancy variation one day before
patient’s discharge on the likelihood of readmission by level of occupancy,
using the conservative approach.
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Note: This figure shows the effects of occupancy rate and occupancy varia-
tion one day before patient’s discharge on the likelihood of readmission by
age, using the conservative approach.
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Note: This figure shows the effects of occupancy rate one day before pa-
tient’s discharge on the likelihood of readmission by thresholds of length
of stay (for the respective DRG and severity level) and by age, using the
conservative approach.
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B.2 Occupancy, readmission and days of the week
The analysis I performed so far uses fixed effects at the week level, considering very fine variation
in occupancy variables that occur in a given week, in a given hospital. Still, I do not consider days
of the week, which are important determinants of hospital occupancy fluctuations mostly through
the supply side of the hospital. Specifically, weekends play a big role in determining supply, as
hospitals do not have as much resources available (physicians, nurses and other staff), which in
turn, determine the level of occupancy of the hospital. Even though these effects must be taken
into account, increasing the range of fixed effects eliminates too much variation in the model1, not
allowing the use of multiplicative fixed effects.
Given the difficulties of including days of the week in the full model, I evaluate them separately.
Table B.3 shows the average values for occupancy variation rate, occupancy rate, standard readmis-
sion and conservative readmission. These descriptive statistics show important differences between
working days and weekends. Not only weekends present much lower occupancy rates, they also
present lower readmission rates. This alerts for the possibility of days of the week explaining part
of the relationship between occupancy variables and readmissions.
Table B.4 displays the readmission rates for all days of the week when occupancy rates are above
and below 85%2. Even conditioning on occupancy, days of the week still present strong differences
between working days and weekends, implying that the weekend effect is there independently of
occupancy rates. The discharging criteria switches across days of the week, and patients are usually
discharged before the weekend, preparing the hospital for a period of lower resource availability.
Rushed discharges are more likely to occur during working days rather than weekends.
1Including year/month/week/day-of-week/hospital fixed effects eliminates all variation in the model since occu-
pancy rates are counted by hospital by day of discharge. Including year/month/day-of-week/hospital fixed effects also
leave very little variation.
2This value was chosen based on Figure B.1, which shows that variation in occupancy only presents significant
effects after occupancy reaches 85%.
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Table B.3: Descriptive statistics on days of the week
Variation Occupancy Standard Conservative
Rate Rate Readmission Readmission
Monday 0.67% 103.2% 9.4% 4.7%
Tuesday 0.07% 103.6% 9.4% 4.7%
Wednesday -0.3% 103.8% 9.1% 4.6%
Thursday -1.07% 102.9% 9.0% 4.5%
Friday -5.65% 100.7% 9.6% 4.9%
Saturday 0.43% 0.91% 6.3% 3.1%
Sunday 3.37% 0.93% 5.8% 2.9%
The table shows the average values of variation in occupancy rate, oc-
cupancy rate, standard readmission rate and conservative readmission
rate.
Table B.4: Descriptive statistics on days of the week
Occupancy > 85% Occupancy < 85%
Standard Conservative Standard Conservative
Readmission Readmission Readmission Readmission
Monday 9.5% 4.8% 7.5% 3.5%
Tuesday 9.5% 4.7% 7.5% 3.4%
Wednesday 9.2% 4.6% 6.9% 3.5%
Thursday 9.1% 4.6% 7.3% 3.5%
Friday 9.7% 4.9% 8.1% 4.2%
Saturday 6.4% 3.2% 5.8% 2.9%
Sunday 5.9% 2.9% 5.3% 2.7%
The table shows the average values of standard readmission rates and con-
servative readmission rates for two different intervals of occupancy rates,
below 85% and above 85%.
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Days of the week present relevant differences between each other, due to the structure of hospital
supply. Thus it is worth asking whether occupancy variables may have different effects on readmis-
sions across each day. To provide some insight on the matter, Table B.5 provides the coefficients
of the occupancy variables one day before discharge for seven regressions, one for each day of the
week.
Table B.5: Main Estimates on the Probability of Readmission per day of the week
Dependent variable: Readmission
Standard Conservative Standard Conservative
Occupancy t-1 Occupancy t-1 Variation t-1 Variation t-1
Occupancy - Monday 0.015 0.011 0.021 0.023
(0.010) (0.007) (0.026) (0.021)
Occupancy - Tuesday 0.032*** 0.025*** -0.021 -0.033*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.023) (0.017)
Occupancy - Wednesday 0.009 0.004 0.010 0.008
(0.008) (0.005) (0.020) (0.016)
Occupancy - Thursday 0.024** 0.016* -0.023 -0.028
(0.008) (0.007) (0.025) (0.015)
Occupancy - Friday 0.023* 0.008 -0.008 -0.011
(0.010) (0.006) (0.021) (0.015)
Occupancy - Saturday 0.014 0.009 -0.006 -0.008
(0.010) (0.008) (0.021) (0.021)
Occupancy - Sunday 0.021 0.009 -0.020 -0.009
(0.015) (0.011) (0.045) (0.034)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the coefficients on occupancy and occupancy variation one day before dis-
charge per day of the week. Each coefficient belongs to an independent equation ran only
with discharges belonging to the respective day of the week. Results use a total of 1,687,348
discharges in 41 Portuguese Public Hospitals, from 2014 to 2016. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the week level and shown in parenthesis. All models include fixed effects at the
Year-Hospital level (123 levels), age groups fixed effects (11) and DRG-Severity fixed ef-
fects (595).
The results show that higher occupancy rates in the day before discharge are positive for all days of
the week, but Tuesday, Thursday and Friday (standard approach) present coefficients statistically
different from zero. This means that when occupancy is higher on Mondays, Wednesdays and
Thursdays (standard approach), patients discharged in the next day are more likely to be readmit-
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ted. Regarding variation in occupancy rates, the results are mostly negative and non-statistically
significant.
B.2.1 Occupancy and Readmission per MDC
The analysis so far has used 7 Major Diagnosis Categories to determine the correlation between
occupancy variables and readmissions. They were chosen among all MDCs because they present
higher rates of readmission. Now, it is time to understand which MCDs are driving the results.
For that purpose, I run again the regression in Equation (2.1), but by MDC. The results of the 7
regressions are displayed in table Table B.6.
Table B.6 shows that the respiratory system, circulatory system and hepatic system are the most
relevant groups when explaining the correlation between occupancy variables and readmissions.
They are the three groups that show higher coefficients across all specifications. They are robust
across occupancy variables, being statistically significant both using occupancy one day before
discharge, and variation in occupancy one day before discharge. They are also robust across the
readmission methodology showing higher and statistically significant results for both approaches
of counting, the standard and the conservative approach.
These three categories are likely to be the ones requiring more resources in earlier stages of hospi-
talizations. A person suffering from a stroke, for instance, needs a stronger intervention at arrival
to avoid greater consequences, but after stabilization does not need as much medical attention. It
is possible that when hospitals become crowded, physicians try to alleviate pressure by discharg-
ing stabilized patients. However, if they do it too soon, they run the risk of promoting readmis-
sions.
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Table B.6: Main Estimates on the Probability of Readmission per MDC
Dependent variable: Readmission
Standard Conservative Standard Conservative
Occupancy t-1 Occupancy t-1 Variation t-1 Variation t-1
Occupancy - Nervous 0.065** 0.017 0.046 -0.008
(0.020) (0.012) (0.026) (0.013)
Occupancy - Respiratory 0.171*** 0.095*** 0.178*** 0.088***
(0.021) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018)
Occupancy - Circulatory 0.070*** 0.053*** 0.069*** 0.027*
(0.017) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012)
Occupancy - Digestive 0.030 0.007 0.039** 0.014
(0.017) (0.008) (0.015) (0.009)
Occupancy - Hepatic 0.098*** 0.069** 0.150*** 0.106***
(0.027) (0.023) (0.030) (0.021)
Occupancy - Musculoskeletal 0.011 -0.001 0.008 0.000
(0.010) (0.006) (0.017) (0.009)
Occupancy - Urinary 0.049* -0.001 0.048 0.016
(0.024) (0.020) (0.034) (0.024)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the coefficients on occupancy and occupancy variation one day before discharge
per MDC. Each coefficient belongs to an independent equation ran only with discharges belong-
ing to the respective MDC. Results use a total of 1,687,348 discharges in 41 Portuguese Public
Hospitals, from 2014 to 2016. Standard errors are clustered at the week level and shown in paren-
thesis. All models include fixed effects at the Year-Month-Week-Hospital level (9,286 levels), age
groups fixed effects (11) and DRG-Severity fixed effects (595).
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B.2.2 Occupancy and Readmission per months
Months are very different and have unique characteristics. Figure 2.1 exemplifies how occupancy
rates vary throughout the year. The relationship between occupancy rates and readmissions may
also change across months. In this section, I analyze this relation independently for each month.
Table B.7 shows that occupancy rates one day before discharge are specially impactful in driving
readmission episodes in the months of January, February, April and July, with positive statistically
significant coefficients both in the standard and conservative approach. Occupancy variation one
day before discharge affects readmissions mostly in January, March, April and June, when the
coefficients are statistically significant in both the standard and the conservative approach. The
results are stronger in the first half of the year which is typically a period of higher pressure due
to seasonal diseases. As displayed in Figure 2.1, it is also the period with higher occupancy rates.
Previously, in Section 2.5.3, I showed that the result is not linear and being discharged at higher
levels of occupancy increases the likelihood of readmission.
B.2.3 Occupancy and Readmission by hospital
As described in Section 2.2, hospitals in the Portuguese Health Service may be very heteroge-
neous. They are located in different regions of the country, have different sizes and are organized
in various different ways. In this section, I study the possibility of the effects of occupancy rates
on readmissions being heterogeneous across the various hospital characteristics. Table B.8 divides
all the hospitals in the dataset by region, type and size. ARS Norte, Centro, LVT, Alentejo and
Algarve, stand for the regions of North, Center, Lisbon and the Tagus Valley, Alentejo and Al-
garve. A comprehensive map of the country is illustrated in Figure B.8. Hospital stands for single
hospitals, Hospital Center is a group of hospitals and ULS is a Local Unit of Health, which inte-
grates inpatient care, primary care and other services. The sizes are divided into Very big, Big,
Medium and Small. I classify hospitals as very big if they belong to the fourth (upper) quartile in
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Table B.7: Main Estimates on the Probability of Readmission per month
Dependent variable: Readmission
Standard Conservative Standard Conservative
Occupancy t-1 Occupancy t-1 Variation t-1 Variation t-1
January 0.038*** 0.019** 0.116*** 0.058***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.024) (0.017)
February 0.042* 0.053*** 0.067 0.026
(0.021) (0.006) (0.034) (0.028)
March 0.017 -0.001 0.100*** 0.031*
(0.016) (0.007) (0.018) (0.015)
April 0.057*** 0.039* 0.093*** 0.032***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.026) (0.008)
May 0.032 0.018 0.077*** 0.028
(0.020) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018)
June 0.053** 0.035 0.087*** 0.032*
(0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014)
July 0.065*** 0.046*** 0.015 0.024
(0.008) (0.012) (0.030) (0.015)
August 0.026 -0.002 0.080** 0.030
(0.014) (0.011) (0.031) (0.015)
September 0.012 0.010 0.008 0.009
(0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
October 0.013 0.003 0.022 0.009
(0.009) (0.014) (0.017) (0.011)
November 0.026 0.022 0.060*** 0.028
(0.020) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table shows the coefficients on occupancy and occupancy variation one
day before discharge per month. Each coefficient belongs to an independent
equation ran only with discharges belonging to the respective month. Results
use a total of 1,687,348 discharges, separated throughout each month regres-
sion, in 41 Portuguese Public Hospitals, from 2014 to 2016. Standard errors
are clustered at the week level and shown in parenthesis. All models include
fixed effects at the Year-Hospital level (123 levels), age groups fixed effects
(11) and DRG-Severity fixed effects (595).
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their percentage of hospitalizations. They are classified as big if they belong to the third quartile,
medium if they belong to the second quartile, and small if they belong to the first quartile. Finally,
I add an observation if hospitals are managed by private companies as a product of a partnership
between the state and a private institution (PPP), or if they are university hospitals.
The results present almost no heterogeneity across regions. Figure B.5 shows the coefficients of
the occupancy one day before discharge on readmissions, divided by region of the hospitals. All
regions display positive and statistically significant coefficients, which shows that the effects found
in Section 2.5.2 are true in all regions. Only ARS Norte and ARS LVT display significantly differ-
ent coefficients from each other, with the southern region presenting a higher effect of occupancy
rates one day before discharge on the probability of readmission.
Figure B.6 shows the occupancy coefficients differentiated by the type of hospital. All types show
positive point estimates, statistically different from zero. PPP hospitals and university hospitals
show lower coefficients, but not distinguishable from other hospital centers, hospitals and ULS.
The impact of occupancy rates one day before discharge on readmission probability is not hetero-
geneous across hospital types.
Figure B.7 shows the occupancy coefficients distinguished by size. All four sizes show positive and
statistical significant coefficients, meaning that, independently of size, higher occupancy rates one
day before discharge increase the probability of readmission. There is no heterogeneity between
different-sized hospitals.
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Figure B.5: Occupancy and readmissions by hospital region
Note: The figure shows the effects of occupancy rates one day before patient’s dis-
charge on the likelihood of readmission discriminated by hospital region (North, Cen-
ter, Lisbon and the Tagus Valley, Alentejo and Algarve), using the standard approach.
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Figure B.6: Occupancy and readmissions by hospital type
Note: The figure shows the effects of occupancy rates one day before patient’s dis-
charge on the likelihood of readmission discriminated by hospital type (Hospital cen-
ter, Hospital, ULS, PPP and University Hospital), using the standard approach.
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Figure B.7: Occupancy and readmissions by hospital size
Note: The figure shows the effects of occupancy rates one day before patient’s dis-
charge on the likelihood of readmission discriminated by hospital size (Very big, Big,
Medium and Small), using the standard approach.
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Table B.8: List of hospitals
Hospital Region Type Size Observation
1 ARS LVT Hospital Medium
2 ARS LVT Hospital Big
3 ARS Norte Hospital Small
4 ARS Norte Hospital Big University Hospital
5 ARS LVT Hospital Small PPP
6 ARS Centro Hospital Center Medium
7 ARS Norte Hospital Center Medium
8 ARS Algarve Hospital Center Big University Hospital
9 ARS LVT Hospital Center Small
10 ARS Centro Hospital Center Small University Hospital
11 ARS Norte Hospital Center Medium
12 ARS Norte Hospital Center Big
13 ARS LVT Hospital Center Very big University Hospital
14 ARS LVT Hospital Center Very big University Hospital
15 ARS LVT Hospital Center Big
16 ARS Centro Hospital Center Big
17 ARS Norte Hospital Center Small
18 ARS LVT Hospital Center Medium
19 ARS LVT Hospital Center Small
20 ARS Norte Hospital Center Big University Hospital
21 ARS LVT Hospital Center Small
22 ARS Norte Hospital Center Very big University Hospital
23 ARS Norte Hospital Center Big
24 ARS Centro Hospital Center Big
25 ARS Centro Hospital Center Very big University Hospital
26 ARS Norte Hospital Center Medium
27 ARS Alentejo Hospital Small
28 ARS Centro Hospital Small
29 ARS LVT Hospital Medium PPP
30 ARS Norte Hospital Small
31 ARS Centro Hospital Small
32 ARS Norte Hospital Small
33 ARS LVT Hospital Medium
34 ARS Norte ULS Medium
35 ARS Alentejo ULS Small
36 ARS Centro ULS Small
37 ARS Alentejo ULS Small
38 ARS Centro ULS Small
39 ARS Alentejo ULS Small
40 ARS Norte ULS Small
41 ARS LVT Hospital Small PPP
The table shows all the hospitals in the dataset by region type and size.142
Figure B.8: Map of ARS





Table C.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Min Max
Self Assessed Health 2.92 1 (very bad) 5 (very good)
Depression Scale 9.80 0 (very depressed) 12 (not depressed)
Disability Index 0.83 0.06 (very limited) 0.98 (not limited)
Education 10.93 0 25
Age 64.40 24 99
Gender (male) 49.99% 0% 100%
Partner Caregiver 5.24% 0% 100%
Employed 22.66% 0 100%
Retired 61.71% 0 100%
Homemaker 9.55% 0 100%
Sick or disabled 2.80% 0 100%
Make Ends Meet 2.98 1 (with great difficulty) 4 (easily)
Observations 99,613
The table displays the overall summary statistics for the sample used in this study. The first
column shows the averages for each variable, while the two last columns show the maxi-
mum and minimum values, respectively.
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Table C.2: Treated vs. Matched
Means/Shares of treated and matched variables
Treated Matched
Parter’s Self Assessed Health 2.03 2.05
Partner’s Depression Scale 8.26 8.25
Partner’s Disability Index 0.64 0.65
Partner’s Age 70.67 70.81
Gender 0.46 0.48
Age 69.87 70.22
Make Ends Meet 2.70 2.70
Retired 0.72 0.71
Employed or Self-Employed 0.11 0.11
Unemployed 0.02 0.02
Permanently sick or disabled 0.04 0.04
Homemaker 0.11 0.11
Other Status 0.01 0.01
The table shows the averages of the variables used in
the matching process. The factor variables of employ-
ment and gender display shares. Each group, matched
and treated, amount to 5,082 individuals each.
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Figure C.1: Partner caregiving and SAH by gender
The graph shows the coefficients of the variable “Partner caregiver” discriminated by
gender, in the SAH regression. The model includes both individuals and partner char-
acteristics.
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Figure C.2: Partner caregiving and depression by gender
The graph shows the coefficients of the variable “Partner caregiver” discriminated by
gender, in the depression regression. The model includes both individuals and partner
characteristics.
148
Figure C.3: Partner caregiving and disability by gender
The graph shows the coefficients of the variable “Partner caregiver” discriminated by
gender, in the disability regression. The model includes both individuals and partner
characteristics.
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Figure C.4: Partner caregiving and SAH by disability
The graph shows the coefficients of the variable “Partner caregiver” discriminated by
disability level, in the SAH regression. The model includes both individuals and part-
ner characteristics.
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Figure C.5: Partner caregiving and depression by disability
The graph shows the coefficients of the variable “Partner caregiver” discriminated by
disability level, in the depression regression. The model includes both individuals and
partner characteristics.
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Figure C.6: Partner caregiving and disability by disability
The graph shows the coefficients of the variable “Partner caregiver” discriminated by
disability level, in the disability regression. The model includes both individuals and
partner characteristics.
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Table C.3: Event study (NC → C) - Caliper Robustness
Self Assessed Health Depression Disability Index
(OProbit) (OProbit) (GLM)
Caliper=0.05
Treatment period -0.005 0.040 0.022
(0.033) (0.032) (0.014)
NC→ C 0.036 0.038 0.048**
(0.035) (0.034) (0.015)
NC→ C in treatment period 0.078* -0.015 0.012
(0.039) (0.039) (0.018)
Caliper=0.1
Treatment period -0.005 0.040 0.022
(0.033) (0.032) (0.014)
NC→ C 0.036 0.037 0.048**
(0.035) (0.034) (0.015)




Treatment period -0.005 0.041 0.021
(0.033) (0.032) (0.014)
NC→ C 0.034 0.037 0.047**
(0.035) (0.034) (0.015)
NC→ C in treatment period 0.078* -0.015 0.015
(0.039) (0.039) (0.018)
Caliper=0.5
Treatment period -0.004 0.042 0.022
(0.033) (0.032) (0.014)
NC→ C 0.035 0.037 0.048**
(0.035) (0.033) (0.015)
NC→ C in treatment period 0.078* -0.016 0.014
(0.039) (0.039) (0.018)
Regressions use a total of 7.704 individual surveys (from which 3,852 belong to the
groups NC → C) collected in waves 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of SHARE (2004, 2007, 2011,
2013 and 2015), in a total of 17 countries. Standard Errors are clustered at the house-
hold level and shown in parenthesis. All models include fixed effects at the country and
wave level. All individual and partner characteristics defined in Section 3.3.1 are used
in the regressions but are omitted in the table.
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Table C.4: Event study (C → C) - Caliper Robustness
Self Assessed Health Depression Disability Index
(OProbit) (OProbit) (GLM)
Caliper=0.05
Treatment period 0.002 0.015 0.010
(0.075) (0.076) (0.032)
C→ C 0.250*** 0.103 0.083*
(0.076) (0.074) (0.034)
C→ C in treatment period -0.076 -0.018 -0.021
(0.077) (0.078) (0.033)
Caliper=0.1
Treatment period -0.007 0.012 0.012
(0.075) (0.076) (0.032)
C→ C 0.247** 0.112 0.082*
(0.076) (0.074) (0.033)
C→ C in treatment period -0.080 -0.022 -0.021
(0.077) (0.078) (0.033)
Caliper=0.2
Treatment period -0.012 0.012 0.015
(0.074) (0.075) (0.031)
C→ C 0.252*** 0.127 0.094**
(0.076) (0.073) (0.034)
C→ C in treatment period -0.084 -0.020 -0.027
(0.076) (0.077) (0.033)
Caliper=0.5
Treatment period -0.021 0.016 0.015
(0.074) (0.074) (0.031)
C→ C 0.237** 0.128 0.095**
(0.075) (0.072) (0.034)
C→ C in treatment period -0.047 -0.026 -0.029
(0.076) (0.076) (0.032)
Regressions use a total of 1.848 individual surveys (from which 924 belong to the
groups C → C) collected in waves 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of SHARE (2004, 2007, 2011,
2013 and 2015), in a total of 17 countries. Standard Errors are clustered at the house-
hold level and shown in parenthesis. All models include fixed effects at the country
and wave level. All individual and partner characteristics defined in Section 3.3.1 are
used in the regressions but are omitted in the table.
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Figure C.7: Effect of transition into caregiving on SAH by country
The graph shows the effect of transitioning into partner caregiving (NC → C) dis-
criminated by country, in the SAH regression.
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Figure C.8: Effect of transition into caregiving on depression by country
The graph shows the effect of transitioning into partner caregiving (NC → C) dis-
criminated by country, in the depression regression.
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Figure C.9: Effect of transition into caregiving on disability by country
The graph shows the effect of transitioning into partner caregiving (NC → C) dis-
criminated by country, in the disability regression.
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Figure C.10: Effect of transition into caregiving on SAH by gender
The graph shows the effect of transitioning into partner caregiving (NC → C) dis-
criminated by gender, in the SAH regression.
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Figure C.11: Effect of transition into caregiving on depression by gender
The graph shows the effect of transitioning into partner caregiving (NC → C) dis-
criminated by gender, in the depression regression.
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Figure C.12: Effect of transition into caregiving on disability by gender
The graph shows the effect of transitioning into partner caregiving (NC → C) dis-
criminated by gender, in the disability regression.
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Figure C.13: Effect of transition into caregiving on SAH by disability
The graph shows the effect of transitioning into partner caregiving (NC → C) dis-
criminated by disability, in the SAH regression.
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Figure C.14: Effect of transition into caregiving on depression by disability
The graph shows the effect of transitioning into partner caregiving (NC → C) dis-
criminated by disability, in the depression regression.
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Figure C.15: Effect of transition into caregiving on disability by disability
The graph shows the effect of transitioning into partner caregiving (NC → C) dis-
criminated by disability, in the disability regression.
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